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DIANE WELLS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

No one who has traced the Supreme Court's latest developments in the area of federal habeas corpus review can debate the
fact that prisoners have more difficulty having federal courts review
claims on the merits today than two decades ago. Nor could anyone
debate that this new restrictive course for habeas review will suddenly discontinue. What is open for debate, however, is the legitimacy of placing the Court's newest target-the capital defendantat the receiving end of this continuing course.
While the Supreme Court imposed the most severe restrictions
to habeas review,1 access to review for prisoners sentenced to death
remained virtually intact. This is highly attributable to the Supreme
Court's own rulings in the death penalty area. The Court's numerous holdings, beginning with Furman v. Georgia2 and Gregg v. Georgia, 3 evolutionized the concept of heightening the procedural
safeguards due the capital defendant because of the nature of the
punishment involved. This concept, that "death is different," had
for the most part remained sacrosanct until the Burger Court became concerned with the substantial increase in death sentence petitions entering the federal habeas process. 4 Two of the most severe
blows to the death penalty habeas corpus jurisprudence, as it previ* J.D., Washington College of Law, American University, 1989; B.S., State University of New York at Oswego, 1986. The author wishes to express her special thanks to

Barbara and Edward Wells for their support and encouragement.
I See Robbins, The Habeas Corpus Certificateof ProbableCause, 44 OHio ST. LJ. 307, n.6
(1983).
2 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
4 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892 (1983).

427

428

DIANE WELLS

[Vol. 80

ously existed, were Barefoot v. Estelle5 and Smith v. Murray.6 As a result of the procedural obstacles created in these cases, as well as
other actions taken by the Court to inhibit attainment of the writ for
capital defendants, the Furman precept has in practice, if not in theory, begun to shrink to a mere formality.
II.
A.

SUPREME COURT LIMITATIONS ON HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW

WAIN WRIGHT V. SYKES AND MURRAY V. CARRIER

The Court has indicated a general hostility toward allowance of
federal habeas review for both state and federal prisoners by imposing procedural limitations on such review. One of these procedural
limitations, the cause and prejudice rule, was established in Wainwright v. Sykes. 7 Sykes claimed in his habeas petition that certain

statements he made to police were inadmissable.8 He failed, however, to contemporaneously object to these admissions at trial, a requirement of the state rules of criminal procedure. 9 The Court of
Appeals held that the trial judge's failure to consider the voluntariness of Sykes' statements did not automatically bar review, even if
the petitioner failed to comply with state procedural rules. 10 In
reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit stressed the fact that there
was a "total absence of any indication that his failure to object was
attributable to trial tactics." " The Supreme Court nevertheless reversed, holding that if a state prisoner failed to properly raise a
claim in state court then the claim is barred from federal review unless the petitioner can show both cause for failing to adhere to the
state procedural rule and prejudice resulting from this violation. 12
The Court's application of a cause and prejudice rule to cases involving a contemporaneous objection rule was not premised on any
requirement of the habeas statute itself, but rather on several policy
considerations favoring imposition of restrictions on federal habeas
review.
The Court first recognized that a contemporaneous objection
rule "enables the record to be made with respect to the constitutional claim when the recollections of witnesses are freshest" and
"may lead to the exclusion of the evidence objected to, thereby
5 Id.
6
7

477 U.S. 527 (1986).
433 U.S. 72 (1977).

8 Id. at 75.
9 Id.
10 Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 527 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
" Id. at 528.
12 433 U.S. at 87-90.
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making a major contribution to finality in criminal litigation."' 3 The
Court based its decision on concerns for federalism, comity, the prevention of "sandbagging," 14 and finally the preservation of the trial
as the "main event" in the criminal justice process.
As a result of the narrow holding in Sykes and the Court's decision to leave the "precise definition of the 'cause-and-prejudice'
standard" to future decisions,' 6 many lower federal courts exercised
broad discretion in determining whether petitioners satisfied this
test. "Typically, the courts balanced the defendant's interest in securing relief, the state's interest in finality and efficiency, and the
needs of the adversarial process." 17 In so doing, many of these
lower courts distinguished between procedural defaults resulting
from strategic decisions and those resulting from ignorance or inadvertence to conclude that Sykes does not preclude the possibility that
inadvertent attorney conduct establishes cause.' 8 However, the
broad discretion that allowed federal courts to make such conclusions has been severely eroded due to subsequent cases extending
and further defining the cause and prejudice test.
In Murray v. Carrier,19 for example, the Court rejected the very
notion expressed above. In Carrier,although counsel initially moved
for discovery of the victim's statements at trial, he failed to include
this claim on appeal. 20 The Fourth Circuit held that "under certain
circumstances error which is insufficient to make out a violation of
the sixth amendment may nevertheless constitute cause under the
[Sykes] exception to procedural bar." 2 ' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a "federal habeas petitioner cannot show cause
for a procedural default by establishing that competent defense
counsel's failure to raise a substantive claim of error was inadvertent
rather than tactical." ' 22 The Court further ruled that ignorance or
inadvertence does not constitute cause for a procedural default just
because the claim was forfeited on appeal rather than at trial, as the
State's interests are not "significantly diminished" whether or not
13 Id. at 88.
14 Counsel deliberately forgoes litigating constitutional claims at trial with the intent

of safeguarding them for use in subsequent post-conviction challenges.
15 Id. at 88-90.
16 Id. at 87.
17 Catz, FederalHabeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: Needfor a PreclusionDoctrineException, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1177, 1184 (1985).
18 Goodman & Sallet, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30 HAsTINGS LJ. 1683, 1719 (1979).
19 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
20 Id.
21 Carrier v. Hutto,.724 F.2d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 1983).
22 477 U.S. at 478.
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counsel's breach stems from ignorance or inadvertence as opposed
to a deliberate decision. 23 However, the Court does attempt to relax this rigid rule by conceding that although "victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause and prejudice
standard," 24 an extraordinary case may arise where a "constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, and in this case a federal habeas Court may grant the
writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural
default." 25 Thus, this exception permits an inquiry by lower federal
courts into the innocent-relatedness of the petitioner's claim to act
as a condition precedent to exercising the power of habeas review,
at least in the procedural default area.
B.

SANDERS V. UNITED STATES AND KUHLMANN V. WILSON

Although application of the doctrine of res judicata has been
rejected with regard to habeas corpus proceedings because
"[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where
life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is
alleged," 2 6 the Supreme Court has nevertheless deemed it necessary to create an alternative method of achieving some degree of
finality in cases involving successive federal habeas applications by
the same prisoner. 2 7 In Sanders v. United States,28 the Court set the
standard for "successive" or an "abuse of the writ" petitions. A federal court may refuse to consider a successive petition on the merits
after first determining that: the same ground had been presented in
a prior application; the prior determination adverse to the applicant
was on the merits; and the "ends ofjustice" would not be served by
29
reaching the merits of the new application.
The opinion was purposely vague with regard to what would
render redetermination of a claim for relief necessary under the
"ends of justice" inquiry.3 0 The Court indicated, however, that if
the earlier habeas proceeding was not "full and fair" within the criteria established in Townsend v. Sain,31 then an evidentiary hearing
23 Id. at 488-92.
24 Id. at 495-96.
25 Id. at 496.
26 Sanders v. United

States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
Id. at 24-26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1.
29 Id. at 15.
30 Williamson, Federal Habeas Corpus: Limitations on Successive Applicationsfrom the Same
Prisoner, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 265, 269 (1973).
31 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
27
28
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should be granted.3 2 Moreover, in a case in which the court discovers new facts or develops new law, subsequent review is warranted
because the initial petition preceded the discovery or development.3 3 The Court further stressed that the applicant has the burden of showing that the ends ofjustice would be served by reaching
the merits of the new application.
The Court distinguished successive petitions involving claims
not raised in an earlier habeas application.3 4 The Court enunciated
that an "abuse of the writ" may be found if a court concludes that
the claim was deliberately withheld or abandoned, or the petitioner
exhibited inexcusable neglect in failing to assert the claim earlier.3 5
In other words, the petitioner can waive his right to assert the claim.
As to what constitutes such a waiver, however, the Court merely
stated that the principles established in Fay v. Noia 3 6 and Townsend v.
Sain3 7 should govern the decision.
The Court's current approach to successive petitions proves
consistent with its curtailment of availability of habeas review for
state prisoners in general. The Court's new policy calls for using
brief per curiam opinions and summary dispositions to quickly dispose of most habeas petitions. It appears that the Court has
adopted a presumption against considering the merits of claims
38
raised in these successive petitions.
In addition, the Court revisited the Sanders ends ofjustice test,
39
established 23 years earlier, in the case of Kuhlmann v. Wilson.
Kuhlmann involved a sixth amendment claim of denial of right to
counsel based on the Court's denial of a motion to suppress statements made to a jailhouse informant. 40 The prisoner, in a successive petition for a writ, claimed that the change in the law
established by the Court's decision in United States v. Henry41 warranted reconsideration of the sixth amendment claim. In order to
provide federal courts with specific guidelines to use in resolving the
"ends of justice" issue, four members of the Court concluded that
"the 'ends of justice' require federal courts to entertain such peti373 U.S. at 16-17.
3 Id. at 17.
34 Id. at 18.
35 Id.
36 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
32

37
38

372 U.S. 293 (1963).

Morris, The Rush to Execution: Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions in Capital Cases, 95
YALE LJ. 371, 373 (1985); see also Daniels v. Blackburn, 763 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1985).
39 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
40 Id. at 439-41
41 477 U.S 264 (1980).

DIANE WELLS

432

[Vol. 80

tions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim
with a colorable showing of factual innocence." 4 2 Justice Stevens,
in his dissenting opinion, did note that in determining "whether the
'ends ofjustice' would be served... one of the facts that may properly be considered is whether the petitioner advanced a 'colorable
claim of innocence,' -43 but he refused to join the plurality in re44
quiring it.
The plurality justified its conclusion by weighing the
competing interests of the prisoner with those of the state. 45 This
attempt to link the ends of justice test to actual innocence clearly
rejected the approach taken in Sanders, which left the decision to
hear successive petitions to the "sound discretion of the federal trial
judges."' 46 However, since less than a majority of the Court took the
position that the approach in Sanders' had been modified, the impact
of the Kuhlmann decision remains dubious.
C.

ROSE V. LUNDY AND GRANBERRY V. GREER

The Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy4 7 is a further indication of
its desire to restrain liberal allowance of federal habeas review for
both state and federal prisoners. In Lundy, the Court adopted a per
48
se rule, termed by Justice Blackmun as the "total exhaustion rule,"
requiring federal district courts to dismiss all habeas petitions if
state remedies have not been exhausted. 4 9 While the Court's decision is consistent with the previous understanding of the exhaustion
doctrine, as codified in section 2254, in that it does not completely
foreclose the power of federal courts to review the merits of federal
claims in state courts, the Court's adoption of the total exhaustion
rule, which establishes the proper timing of such review, goes beyond what is mandated by the code. 50 In so doing, the Court has
nevertheless succeeded in transforming the exhaustion doctrine
into "something approaching a jurisdictional barrier to federal
review." 5 1
42 477 U.S. at 454.
43 Id. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44 Id.

45 Id. at 452.
46 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963).
47 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
48 Id. at 522 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
50 See Comment, Lundy, Isaac and Frady: A Trilogy of Habeas Corpus Restraint, 32 CATU.L. REV. 169, n.120 (1982) [hereinafter Habeas Corpus Restraint];see also 455 U.S. at 523
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (Justice Blackmun noted that "neither the language nor the
legislative history of [these provisions] mandates dismissal" of mixed habeas petitions).
51 Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to
First Principles, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 393, 394 (1983).
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Justice O'Connor appeared to acknowledge the fact that section
2254 does not militate a total exhaustion requirement, yet she
worked around this recognition by claiming that Congress never
specifically addressed the problem of mixed petitions. 5 2 Justice
O'Connor further noted that no prior Supreme Court case dealt
with the situation of a habeas petition containing both exhausted
and unexhausted claims; therefore, the issue remained unresolved.
Consequently, she considered the underlying policy considerations
of the exhaustion doctrine, as established by precedent, and relied
5
on these considerations, to "determine its proper scope."
Justice O'Connor suggested that the plurality's opinion rests
primarily on the recurring principle that the state courts should
have the first opportunity to correct a constitutional violation alleged by state prisoners.5 4 She claimed that states will not only benefit from "a rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule" because such
a rule guarantees that petitioners will seek initial relief of their
claims in state courts, but it will also increase the state courts' familiarity with federal constitutional issues. 55 The plurality further contended that full exhaustion of federal claims in state courts provides
more efficient federal review because the courts will have the benefit
of reviewing these claims with a complete factual record provided by
the state. 56 Next, the plurality stated that the exhaustion requirement "reduces piecemeal litigation," therefore benefitting prisoners
as well as the courts due to the increased likelihood that review of all
the prisoners' claims will occur in a single proceeding, "thus provid57
ing for a more thorough and focused review."
Finally, the plurality acknowledged the prisoner's interest in obtaining speedy review of his claims, and consequently stated that the
total exhaustion rule will not necessarily impair this interest because
the prisioner "can always amend the petition to delete the
unexhausted claims, rather than returning to state court to exhaust
all of his claims." 5 8 However, this assertion assumed new meaning
when viewed in accordance with the plurality's further suggestion
that while the petitioner does have the choice of deleting his
unexhausted claims from the petition and later resubmitting these
claims following state exhaustion, the federal courts may refuse to
455 U.S. at 516.
Id. at 517.
54 Id. at 518.
55 Id. at 518-19.
56 Id. at 519.
57 Id. at 520.
58 Id.
52
53
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treat them. 5 9 The Plurality based this conclusion on the principle
governing the abuse of the writ doctrine set forth in Sandrs.60 In
essence, the Plurality said that a prisoner who decided to proceed
only with his exhausted claims was deliberately setting aside his
unexhausted claims; therefore, the claims constituted an abuse of
the writ and should be dismissed.
However, as Justice Brennan stated, the "plurality's conclusion
simply distorts the meaning of the quote of [Sanders'] language.''61
Since the Sanders decision specifically established that dismissal for
"abuse of the writ" is only appropriate when a prisoner "knowingly" and "deliberately" chooses not to assert a claim, or when the
court is faced with "needless piecemeal litigation" or with collateral
proceedings "whose only purpose is to vex, harass or delay" in order to get more than "one bite of the apple," 6 2 it becomes clear that
the term "deliberately" as used in Sanders cannot include abandoning unexhausted claims by a petitioner who is not permitted to
proceed with them.6 3 "Since the prisoner has no choice in the matter, it would be unrealistic and patently unfair to impose a penalty
for a supposed abuse.' ",64 In essence, then, dismissing subsequent
petitions on "abuse of the writ" grounds without further inquiry
into "factual circumstances truly suggesting abuse" blatantly disregards the principles espoused in Sanders, and therefore diminishes
65
this concept of abuse.
In the more recent case of Granberry v. Greer,66 the Court, to a
certain degree, relaxed the rigidity for the Lundy total exhaustion
rule. In Granberry, the Court held that when a state fails to raise an
"arguably meritorious non-exhaustion defense," federal habeas review of petitioners claims will not be automatically barred. Rather,
the Court "should determine whether the interests of comity and
federalism will be better served by addressing the merits forthwith
or by requiring a series of additional state and district court proceedings" before permitting such review. 6 7 The Court further suggested certain instances in which it would prove beneficial for the
federal court to address the merits initially. 68 For example, if the
59 Id. at 521.
60 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
61 455 U.S. at 535 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62 Id. at 535-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64 See Yackle, supra note 51, at 434.
65 See Habeas Corpus Restraint, supra note 50, at 434.
66 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
67 Id. at 134.

68 Id. at 134-5.

RETURN TO FURMAN

41989]

435

* petitioner fails to raise a "colorable federal claim, the interests of
the petitioner, the warden, the state attorney general, the state
courts and the federal courts," will all best be served, notwithstanding, the state's failure to raise the exhaustion defense, if the district
court outright denies the habeas petition. 6 9 This conclusion may be
applicable as well to a case in which a miscarriage of justice has occurred after trial in district court because it would avoid prolonging
the prisoner's confinement where relief is plainly warranted.7 0 In
contrast, however, the Court intimated that where an unresolved
question of fact or state law having an important bearing is
presented, it would be more appropriate in the interests of comity
and judicial efficiency for the Court "to insist.on complete exhaustion to make sure that it may ultimately review the issue on a fully
7
informed basis." '

IIL ,
A.

RE-EVALUATING THE LEGITIMACY OF PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS

WAINWRIGHT V SYKES AND MURRAY V. CARRIER

The Court's formulation of the cause and prejudice test as set
out in Sykes may create a situation in which juries might determine
that a conviction violates due process, thereby rendering the conviction clearly unconstitutional. Yet because the prisoner cannot establish cause, the prisoner cannot obtain federal relief from this
unconstitutional conviction.7 2 If the procedural default by Sykes' attorney involved a claim of a confession forced out of Sykes by physical abuse, notwithstanding the existence of sufficient evidence to
establish guilt, the Court arguably would not have imposed the for78
feiture so readily.
However, it is precisely in these cases, where a constitutional
violation is particularly egregious, that the likelihood of a procedural default occurring even by a relatively ineffective attorney is
minimal.7 4 In contrast, where the constitutional right is not so egregious or well-established, the likelihood of a procedural default is
69

Id. at 135.

70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See Guttenburg, FederalHabeas Corpus, ConstitutionalRights and ProceduralForfeitures:

The Delicate Balance 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 617, 677 (1984).
78 See Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: ProceduralDefaults by Reasonably Incompetent
Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REV. 341, 441 (1978); see also Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967) (the Court stated that "our
prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial
that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error").
74 Id.
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greatly increased. 75 These assertions, then, reveal a disturbing aspect of the decision in Sykes: only the most blatant constitutional
76
violations will be preserved for litigation in a federal habeas court.
In essence, Sykes not only dilutes federal remedies but federal constitutional rights as well. 77 The above analysis becomes more significant because it is highly improbable that such gross violations of
the sort that occurred during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s are likely
to occur today; rather, in today's more advanced society, the constitutional rights that must be confronted prove more subtle and complex.7 8 This does not mean, however, that they are any less
reprehensible. Furthermore, it is plausible to suggest that although
the due process rights of criminal defendants will not expand to the
comparable degree they did in previous decades, neither will they
cease. The Court nevertheless advances various policy considerations in Sykes to justify the possible risk of diluting constitutional
rights of prisoners by limiting federal review.
While many of the Court's policy considerations do have merit,
some aspects of these policies prove problematic. The Court, in its
desire to end litigation at some reasonably identifiable time, has
used procedural forfeitures as a means to achieve this goal of finality
in criminal judgments. The Court fails to explain why this goal
should prevail over review of constitutional questions that affect a
citizen's liberty and possibly his life. 79 Professor Bator, an advocate
of greater finality in the criminal process, has admitted that, by accepting finality, one acknowledges that certain errors may go uncorrected.8 0 Yet he also asserts that collateral review will not
necessarily attain an error-free process. 8 ' Although this assertion
may prove valid when state courts have previously considered the
constitutional claims, the validity of this assertion is seriously undermined when those constitutional issues have never been presented
82
or litigated in any court due to forfeiture.
While the concept of finality is desirable, using procedural defaults to attain this goal permits the state to rely on its default rules
75 Id.
76 But see infra note 376 and accompanying text. After Smith v. Murray, even blatant

constitutional violations may not be vindicated if they are not related to the guilt-innocence determination.
77 See Rosenberg, supra note 73, at 444-45.
78 Id. at 439.

79 See Guttenberg, supra note 72, at 681.
80 Id. at 681-82.
81 Id. at 682.
82

Id.
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to deny review of all imporperly raised constitutional claims.8 3 This
enables the state to benefit from the commingling of its own constitutional wrongdoing and the defense counsel's failure to raise these
issues,8 4 which becomes highly problematic in view of the fact that
the state sets the procedural forfeiture rules, decides when to excuse
or enforce those rules, and licenses and appoints the defense bar.8 5
Furthermore, as Justice Brennan noted, finality issues bear no
relevance to the question of whether a federal court should refuse to
exercise its power of review based on a procedural default.8 6 The
state's finality interests are no more lessened by making habeas review available after the state court has reviewed a claim on the merits than after the state court has denied the claim on grounds of
procedural default.8 7 In any event, the state court has already
deemed the litigation at an end. Justice Brennan concluded that because no one questions the availability of habeas relief when a state
court denies the claim on the merits, the same should be true where
the claim is denied due to procedural default, "unless the State's
interest in enforcing its default rules requires a different result." 88
This suggestion applies as well to the Court's observation that allowing federal courts to review a petitioner's claim, notwithstanding
the failure to comply with a state procedural rule, "detract[s] from
the importance of the trial as the main event"'8 9 because this "cost"
is present regardless of whether the state denies a claim on the merits or on procedural default grounds. 90 In fact, it would seem these
"costs" exist to a greater extent when a "federal court reviews a
constitutional claim that the state court has considered and rejected." 9 ' The trial will remain the "main event" regardless of liberal allowance of federal habeas review, if for no other reason than
acquittal being the primary concern of the defendant in every criminal case. 9 2 In addition, whenever a federal court examines a state
judgment, particularly in a case in which it excuses a failure to comply with a state procedural rule, the concerns of federalism and
comity come into play; therefore, evaluation of these interests be83
84

Id. at 683.
Id.

85 Id.

86 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 520-21 n.2 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
90 Carrier,477 U.S. at 521 n.2.
91 Id.
92

See Guttenberg, supra note 72, at 693.
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comes necessary. 93
Since the Supreme Court has recognized the value of state procedural rules, 94 the Court has strictly enforced them to avoid undermining their legitimacy. However, as Justice Brennan has noted, the
legitimacy of such rules must be weighed against the "interests implicated by a prisoner's petition to a federal court to review the merits of a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim." 95 By enacting
section 2254, Congress positioned the federal courts between the
states and the people to protect people from unconstitutional action. These "interests" of the federal courts-to safeguard constitutional rights-are intensified when the state court has refused to
review claims challenging constitutional violations, "for without
habeas review no court will ever consider whether the petitioner's
'96
constitutional rights were violated."
Even if the state's interests as discussed above are legitimate to
justify the strict enforcement of state procedural rules, these interests are greatly diminished when considering a more substantial injustice which emanates from Sykes. 9 7 The Court in Sykes not only
allowed for the possibility of a constitutional violation to go uncorrected but did so by binding the defendant to defense counsel's decision to by-pass a state procedure.9 8 The Court's later decision in
Carrier,underscores this injustice.9 9 As Justice Brennan noted, it is
one thing to bind the petitioner to his lawyer's tactical decisions, but
it is quite another to bind him to his lawyer's inadvertent
mistakes.' 0 0
The Court justified these decisions with its "sandbagging" concern. The sandbagging concept, however, rests on the assumption
that counsel has considered the strategic and tactical advantage of
not raising the "constitutional claim in a proper and timely manner
at trial, the chances of eventually deceiving the federal court, and
finally the possibilities of obtaining relief on the merits of the collat0 This concept becomes
eral proceeding."' '1
clearly inapplicable to
attorneys who commit defaults due to their negligence or ignorance.
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Carrier:
Id. at 685.
See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
127-28 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-89 (1977).
95 Carrier,477 U.S. at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97 433 U.S. at 72.
93
94

98 Id.

99 Carrier,477 U.S. at 478.
100 477 U.S. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101 See Guttenberg, supra note 72, at 695.
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Where counsel is unaware of a claim or of the duty to raise it at a
particular time, the procedural default rule cannot operate as a specific
deterrent to noncompliance with the State's procedural rules. Consequently, the State's interest in ensuring that the federal court help prevent circumvention of the State's procedural rules
by imposing the
02
same forfeiture sanction is much less compelling.1
Moreover, this view of defense strategy proves unrealistic. As Justice Brennan noted, good defense tactics would militate raising constitutional objections in accordance with state law because the
defendant not only increases the possibility of acquittal at trial or
reversal on appeal in the state courts, but also safeguards the availability of federal habeas remedies.10 3 By choosing to sandbag, counsel inevitably runs the risk of possible forfeiture of all direct state
and federal remedies.' 0 4 It is irrational to assume that competent
counsel would even undertake such a risk in the hopes that a subsequent federal habeas court would prove more sympathetic to the
claim than the state court.10 5
In short, refusing to "continue the quest for justice, especially
when the state has refused to consider the constitutional questions
due to an attorney's failure to follow the proper rules of procedure,"' 0 6 is not a legitimate proposition., Any acquiescence to the
possibility of error should not be undertaken lightly nor should it
occur before carefully analyzing the costs involved-an analysis
which appears to be lacking from the Court's restriction of federal
habeas review. 10 7 The Court's acquiescence to this possibility of error, enhanced by its limitation of what constitutes "cause" in Carrier,
may be defended by the further provision allowing habeas corpus to
remain available despite the absence of a "'showing of cause" if the
constitutional claim in question implicates "actual innocence."
Although such an approach may be consistent with the Court's more
recent limitations on federal habeas review in general, it signals a
radical change in that review as it previously existed.' 0 8
B.

SANDERS V. UNITED STATES AND KUHLMANN

V. WILSON

In all probability the Supreme Court in Sanders not only wished
to preserve an avenue by which federal courts can choose to enter102 477 U.S. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103 Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 103 n.5 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting).
105 See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L.
REV. 1315, 1369-70 (1961).
106 See Guttenberg, supra note 72, at 683.

107 Id.
108 See infra notes 378-83 and accompanying text.
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tain new grounds for relief, but also attempted to reduce multiple
petitions in an effort to achieve some degree of finality in priorjudgments. However, while the Sanders decision remains for the most
part intact, it has been severely criticized on numerous grounds.
For example, concern has been expressed over the Court's act of
equating the Townsend "full and fair" hearing criteria with its own
requirement of finding that the "ends ofjustice" would be served by
reviewing an additional application in Sanders. 10 9
The difficulty arises as a result of the Court's placing on the
applicant the burden of showing that the ends of justice would be
served by a redetermination." 0 This act "introduces an element
not present in Townsend v. Sain, since nothing in that decision indicates that the applicant must assume the burden of proving that the
state hearing was not full and fair.""' Moreover, equating what
constitutes a waiver to justify implementation of the abuse of the
writ remedy with the standards enunciated in Noia i1 2 presents
problems as well."ts Permitting prisoners to file successive petitions
may be particularly susceptible to criticism for several reasons. If
the prisoner adequately presents his first petition he will already
have had the benefit of at least one federal hearing, "free from the
momentum of the guilt-determining process." 1 4 Furthermore,
"the procedures in such a hearing were presumptively adequate; the
federal judge was presumptively willing to protect federal rights if
they clashed with state or federal regulatory aims.'1 5 Moreover,
since the petitioner will also have had an independent hearing providing an opportunity to discover constitutional error and inadequate process as well as to remedy inadequate development of a
109 See Williamson, supra note 30, at 278.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 278-79.

112 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
113 See Williamson, supra note 30, at 282-83, arguing that the circumstances in which
waiver was considered in Noia bears little relation to the context of successive habeas
applications alleging new grounds for relief. Noia involved questions of trial strategy in
which a benefit was anticipated and in which counsel participated. In successive federal
habeas proceedings, the prisoner in most cases has no counsel and little is to be gained
from consciously failing to raise all constitutional claims in the defendant's first application. Id. at 282. But see Id. at 284, arguing that when the second habeas petition is
based on "new" evidence, holding the applicant to waiver because of inexcusable neglect is consistent with the writ because once the legal grounds for relief have been
"formulated, if questions of fact are involved, counsel normally is appointed to represent the applicant." Since in this case counsel does make strategic decisions, he acts in
the same capacity as the trial attorney.
114 See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1149
(1970) [hereinafter Developments].
"15 Id.
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claim, it is highly unlikely that petitioner's claim will be vindicated
after another proceeding acting on the same information.' 1 6 Nevertheless, adhering to strict denial of successive petitions on the
grounds that there has been a previous opportunity to present constitutional claims in a federal forum fails to give proper weight to
the fact that many first petitions' do not adequately present all of a
petitioner's claims. 17 Many of the reasons that a petitioner fails to
present his claims adequately in his first petition seem valid, 1 8 especially in light of the Court's recognition in Sanders that most habeas
petitions are prepared without assistance of counsel.' 1 9
If, in fact, the Court's action is premised on a desire to dissuade
prisoners from engaging in piecemeal litigation, the possibility of
which was acknowledged in Sanders,120 there is little need for such
action. The prisoner seems to derive little benefit from failing to set
forth all the grounds that he thinks might have merit in his first
12 1
application.
It seems virtually inconceivable that a prisoner who seeks his liberty
will not allege every known basis which might support his release. This
is undoubtedly why so many frivolous grounds are alleged in post-conviction petitions since the prisoner, unschooled in the law, seeks his
freedom on every ground he can imagine. It is in the prisoner's selfinterest to allege constitutional infirmities, not because of procedural
forfeiture, but because of continued imprisonment. Judicial anathema
will never surpass a prisoner's unending quest for relief22as an effective
limitation on fragmented consideration of his claims.'
116 Id. (acknowledging that further proceedings would be justified by a change in the
facts or applicable law).
117 See Weick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas
Corpus Be Eliminated?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 740, 749 (1972).

118 Id.

There are, of course, a number of reasons why a petitioner fails to present claims
adequately in his first petition, even though his efforts are made in good faith.
Some prisoners lack education; in such case petitioner's efforts may be nearly incomprehensible, sometimes written by pencil on tissue paper and so lacking in such
specificity or relevant facts that the petitioner may learn of his claims piecemeal.
Id.
119 Sanders v.United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11 (1963).
120 Id. at 12.
121 See Williamson, supra note 30, at 283; see also Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A
Study in Massachusetts,87 HARv. L.'REv.321, 354-55 (1973) (arguing that the problem of
successive petitions may be mitigated in very large degree if the problem of exhaustion
can be resolved because data indicates that once a petitioner has had his case heard and
disposed of on the merits, he is not likely to return to the federal court on the same or a
related claim).
122 See Williamson, supra note 30, at 281-82; see also Id. at 283 (arguing that patently
frivolous successive petitions or petitions clearly without merit can be summarily dismissed without significant cost to judicial resources); Developments, supra note 114, at
1153 (arguing that the problem of abuse of the writ is greatly overstated because "most
prisoners of course are interested in being released as soon as possible; only rarely will
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In addition, one of the essential functions of federal habeas
corpus is to remedy error that becomes apparent only after prior
habeas proceedings.' 23 In the case of new fact or law, a significant
gain in accuracy becomes possible. Moreover, the bar against second petitions is not warranted under the deterrent rationale of
waiver in these "new law claim" situations. These views would seem
to argue against the Supreme Court's new approach of placing "new
law" claims in jeopardy of summary dismissal: 124 concerns for finality should not outweigh the concern for justice.
The Court's new approach to successive petitions only serves to
amplify the plight of state prisoners in trying to raise constitutional
claims in subsequent applications, regardless of whether they deserve further attention. This approach may be premised on the general trend throughout much of habeas corpus law emphasizing
concerns of comity, federalism, and finality of judgment, or, more
specifically, on the Court's dissatisfaction with the impact of the
Sanders treatment of successive petitions in dealing with these recurring concerns.' 25 No matter how valid the need to alter prior treatment of successive petitions, this particular approach may prove
unnecessary.
Strict adherence to Sanders requires the district court to determine that "the ends ofjustice" would not be served by reaching the
merits of a subsequent application.' 26 In order to satisfy this requirement of Sanders, the judge must first partake in an elaborate
inquiry into the allegations and facts and spend time evaluating the
case. Furthermore, the Sanders Court specifically linked the meaning
of the "ends ofjustice" clause to situations in which the first hearing
on the merits of the claim was not "full and fair."' 12 7 In so doing,
the Court emphasizes that the underlying purpose of a federal
habeas corpus proceeding "is not merely to provide an additional
forum in which a prisoner may assert that his constitutional rights
have been denied; rather it is to ensure a continuing mechanism for
determinations that such rights have been afforded."' 28 In light of
the fact that the Court has not overruled Sanders, justifying the summary dismissal of successive petitions without reaching the merits
one inexcusably neglect to raise all available issues in his first federal application"). But
see Goodman, Use andAbuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313, 315 n.8 (1948) (in a
five-year period, five prisoners filed 50, 27, 24, 22, and 20 petitions respectively).
123 See supra note 34.
124 See Morris, supra note 38, at 384.
125 See infra notes 304, 308 & 311.
126 See supra note 29.
127 See Weick, supra note 117, at 749.
128 See supra note 32.
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becomes more problematic. This is especially true since "often very
little extra effort short of an evidentiary hearing, would be required
129
to deal with the application on its merits.
It appears that certain members of the Court deemed the Sanders "ends of justice" standard especially inadequate in dealing with
the need for finality because the standard leaves lower federal courts
with too much discretion in choosing to review successive applications.1 3 0 As the Court noted in Kuhlmann, "failure to provide clear
guidance" leaves district judges "at large in disposing of applications for a writ of habeas corpus, creating the danger that they will
engage in the exercise not of law but of arbitrariness." 13 1 Although
only a plurality of the Court accepted the position, the decision may
nevertheless have important implications for the future. It therefore
becomes necessary to discuss why the underlying rationales for such
a view may prove incorrect. As noted by Justice Brennan in his dissent, the plurality suggests that a prisoner is only "entitled to
habeas relief if his interest in freedom from unconstitutional incarceration outweighs the State's interests in the administration of its
criminal laws."' 13 2 The plurality further suggests that under "federal
review of state court convictions [pursuant to section 2254] is predicated solely on the need to prevent the incarceration of an innocent
person."1 3 3 By implying that factual innocence is "central to our
habeas jurisprudence generally," ' 13 4 the plurality is able to reach its
position in Kuhlmann.
However, a problem arises in that the plurality's assertions are
not supported by "statutory language, legislative history or our
precedents."1 3 5 As Justice Brennan points out in his dissent:
Contrary to the plurality's assertions, the Court has never delineated
the general scope of the writ by weighing the competing interests of
the prisoner and the State. Our cases addressing the propriety of federal collateral review of constitutional error made at trial or on appeal
have balanced these interests solely with respect to claims that were
See Williamson, supra note 30, at 277.
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444-47, 455 (1986).
Id. at 445 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
132 Id. at 462 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 462 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court states:
Despite [the substantial] costs [federal habeas review imposes upon the States],
Congress has continued to afford federal habeas relief in appropriate cases, "recognizing the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against compelling an
innocent [person] to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty."
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Stone V. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491-492 n.1
(1976)).
134 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129
130
131
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36
procedurally defaulted in state court.1

Moreover, although Stone v. Powell,'3 7 a case upon which the Court
heavily relies, limited those claims subject to habeas review, it did
not do so by creating a new standard that must be met by all prisoners whereby their interests must not only outweigh those of the state
but their claims must also make out a "colorable showing of factual
innocence."'' 3 8 The cases following Powel1 39 evidence this by consistently declining to extend the Powell limitations on federal habeas
review to any other context. 140
The plurality's assertion in Sanders that Congress created Rule
9(b)141 or section 2244(b) to establish factual innocence as a predi-

cate for review of successive habeas petitions seems to break down
in light of the fact that in "adopting Rule 9(b) Congress expressly
endorsed the existing case law governing subsequent petitions and
cited Sanders."'142 Congress's concern, rather than being to correct
the problem of a guilty prisoner seeking successive review, lies
solely with the problem posed by successive applications presenting
vexatious or meritless claims.' 43 In this light then, even if the Sanders ends ofjustice test needs some degree of refinement for the policy reasons advanced by the plurality, defining the test in such a way
as to require successive applicants to make a "colorable showing of
factual innocence"' 144 before relief is made available is at best
unreasonable.
C.

ROSE V. LUNDY AND GRANBERRY V. GREER

While it may be said that the exhaustion doctrine generally provides a feasible means for preserving the state court's role in enforcing federal laws, the same cannot be said of the total exhaustion
rule. Some have criticized the Lundy decision on the basis that the
total exhaustion rule does not necessarily vindicate the considerations discussed by the Court.14 5 As Justice Blackmun pointed out in
his concurrence, the comity considerations advanced by the Court
are not defeated by allowing district courts to consider the ex136

Id. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

137
138
139
140
141
142
143

428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 465 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
477 U.S. at 465-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
477 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 469-70 (BrennanJ. dissenting).

144 See supra note 138.

145 See Habeas Corpus Restraint, supra note 50, at n.248.
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hausted habeas claims of a mixed petition. 14 6 If this approach is
taken, the state courts are not denied the first opportunity to rule on
every constitutional challenge and to correct any such error before a
federal court considers it on habeas.' 4 7 Justice Blackmun further
argued that in some respects the Court's ruling was "more destructive than solicitous of federal-state comity."' 14 8 The Court also relied on federal interests to justify a total exhaustion rule; however,
these interests are even more unsatisfactory than the state interests
that support such a rule. The first of the Court's concerns-the "efficient administration of the federal courts"-is undermined rather
than enhanced by the Court's current approach with regard to exhaustion. 4 9 In order to comport with the total exhaustion rule federal courts must now not only review the record initially to
determine whether all claims have been exhausted, but in all likelihood must do so again when the prisoner returns to court for a review of the previously unexhausted claims.' 50
Furthermore, while it is inevitable that the state courts' presentation of complete factual records to the federal courts will make the
subsequent review easier, efficiency of litigation is not a valid reason
to postpone that litigation until after state courts have acted.' 5 '
Federal review is not deferred to allow the state courts to assist the
federal courts in the exercise of their independent habeas jurisdiction,
but rather to accord appropriate respect to state interests in orderly
administration and to ensure state152courts a proper role in the creation
and development of federal law.
It has been suggested that state courts might take offense to the
requirement that calls for lower federal courts to delay federal review because they stand to benefit from prior state review "as
though the state courts were stalking horses to be used by federal
153
judges anxious to conserve their own efforts in habeas cases."'
Furthermore, as pointed out by Justice Blackmun, the federal courts
are already afforded satisfactory means by which they can perform
their task within a complete factual record. 154 This argument, that it
146 Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 524-525 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
147 It. (Blackmun, J. concurring).
148 Id. at 525 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For example, "[r]emitting a habeas petitioner to state court to exhaust a patently frivolous claim before the federal court may
consider a serious, exhausted ground for relief hardly demonstrates respect for the state
courts." Id.
149 Id. at 527 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
150 Id. at 526-27 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
151 See Yackle, supra note 51, at 429-430.
152 Id. at 430.
15S Id.

154 455 U.S. at 526 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun disagreed that

446

DIANE WELLS

[Vol. 80

is not the state courts' function to assist in making federal habeas
adjudication efficient, also diminishes the Court's assertion that the
total exhaustion rule discourages piecemeal litigation. State courts
should not be accorded with the responsibility of entertaining a
whole range of issues for the purpose of providing federal courts
with the benefit of reviewing all the petitioner's claims in one
proceeding. 155
Finally, the Court claims that its ruling, requiring dismissal of
mixed petitions, furthers the interests of federal courts by relieving
them of "the difficult if not impossible task of deciding when claims
are related, and will reduce the temptation to consider unexhausted
claims."' 156 This argument is highly questionable as well because, as
Justice Blackmun indicated in his dissent, the federal courts that
have addressed interrelatedness have had no apparent problems
157
distinguishing between "related" and "unrelated" claims.
Others have criticized the plurality's total exhaustion rule because it is inflexible and it assumes that federal district courts cannot
be trusted to apply a discretionary doctrine properly, and that, if left
to themselves, "federal judges would lurch to the merit of federal
claims without just cause."' 15 8 Justice Stevens in his dissent in Lundy
chastised the plurality's "inflexible, mechanical rule" because it acts
to arbitrarily prevent district judges from administering their calendars effectively. t 59 Justice Stevens argued that the availability of
habeas relief should not depend upon the procedural history of the
prisoner's claim, but upon the nature of the alleged constitutional
violation.' 6 0 He concluded that if the trial was fundamentally unfair,
postponing relief is totally unwarranted because, if the prisoner
were innocent, he would be required to "languish in jail" until the
completion of another round of review in the state and federal
courts.'

61

On the other hand, if the prisoner were guilty, the delay

is still unwarranted because it makes it more difficult for the prosecutor to obtain a conviction on retrial.' 62 In light of this, Justice
Stevens argued that district judges should be allowed to exercise
the issue of interrelated claims must be restricted by a total exhaustion requirement,
because federal courts have had no difficulty addressing the issue and can always dismiss
the entire petition. Id. at 526 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
155 See Yackle, supra note 51, at 430.
156 Rose, 455 U.S. at 519.
157 Id. at 526 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
158 See Yackle, supra note 51, at 394-95.
159 455 U.S. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 547-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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their discretion in determining whether the existence of an
unexhausted claim makes it inappropriate to consider the merits of
163
a properly pleaded exhausted claim.
Moreover, the Court in Granberry'64 acknowledged that when
the states fail to raise the nonexhaustion defense in the district
court, the court of appeals may in certain instances consider the
merits regardless of the petitioner's failure to exhaust. 165 The
Court suggested that if it failed to take this approach, states may be
encouraged to postpone raising the nonexhaustion defense for use
on appeal.' 66 The Court seems to base its conclusion that "the
State's omission [in certain instances] makes it appropriate for the
court of appeals to take a fresh look at the issue" on the premise
that in these cases the interests of comity and federalism are significantly lessened and therefore would be better served if the federal
court "address[ed] the merits forthwith."' 167 However, the Court
failed to establish why in these certain instances the interests of
comity and federalism would not be better served by allowing the
federal court to review the merits forthwith, even if the state asserts
the exhaustion doctrine initially. The state's interests in comity and
federalism are virtually identical regardless of the time the state
raises the defense. In reality, then, the total exhaustion requirement, established to promote federal-state comity, does so at the
cost of limiting the discretion of the federal courts to entertain meritorious exhausted claims when paired with unexhausted claims and
8
requires duplicative review of state habeas petitions.16
IV.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT "DEATH IS DIFFERENT"

The Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly in the decade since
Gregg 169 that the eighth amendment requires a heightened degree of
reliability in any case in which a state seeks to take the defendant's
life.' 70 This concern arises from the premise that the death penalty
is qualitatively different from other forms of punishment.' 7 1 Once
the death penalty is imposed, because of its irrevocability, no constitutional wrong can ever be rectified. Therefore, it would seem that,
before allowing the imposition of such a penalty, courts should be
Id. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
481 U.S. 129 (1987).
See supra note 67.
166 481 U.S. at 134-35.
167 Id. at 134.
168 See Habeas Corpus Restraint, supra note 50, at 206.
169 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
170 Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
171 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358 (1977).
163
164
165
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extremely certain of two factors: 1) that the accused is in fact guilty,
and 2) that no. constitutional rights would be denied by allowing for
the execution of the accused. The Court apparently recognized this
unique need to minimize the possibility of premature or unwarranted execution by frequently condemning procedures in capital
1 72
cases that might be completely acceptable in noncapital cases.
Furthermore, many states require mandatory appellate review in
death penalty cases, whereas no such requirement is applied to non73
capital cases.'
This realization that "death is different" also applies to the theory that courts should exercise more flexibility in granting federal
habeas review when a life is at stake. As codified by Congress, the
federal writ serves as a form of collateral review of state judgments
by federal courts whereby the federal judiciary can protect constitutional guarantees. These constitutional protections afforded by federal habeas corpus are most needed in death penalty cases.' 74 The
Court has even recognized that the threat of the death penalty may
in certain circumstances exert a special pull in favor of the exercise
of the federal court's undisputed statutory power to entertain a
1 75
habeas corpus writ on a procedurally defaulted claim.
Consequently, despite the presumption of finality attributed to
a criminal conviction once the defendant has exhausted all avenues
of appeal, federal courts reviewing post-conviction petitions for
habeas corpus are "particularly sensitive to comprehensive and
careful review of death penalty cases."' 176 For example, in discussing the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, which permits
appeal for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "the nature of the penalty is a proper consideration in
172 Lockett v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 586 (1978) (capital sentencing scheme limiting range of
mitigating circumstances that can be considered by the sentencer held unconstitutional);
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (death sentence unconstitutional as applied in

capital offense where jury was not permitted to consider guilty verdict of a lesser included offense); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death

sentence violates eighth and fourteenth amendments).
'73 See Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairnessand
Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1129, 1137 (1984) [hereinafter CapitalPunishment].
174 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 309 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-896 (1961)) ("For we have long
recognized that the degree of procedural regularity required by the Due Process Clause
increases with the importance of the interests at stake."); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 118 (1982) ("[The Supreme Court] has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure
that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee as
much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion,
prejudice or mistake").
175 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440 (1963).
176 See Capital Punishment, supra note 173, at 1137.
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determining whether to issue a certificate of probable cause." 177
In light of Supreme Court decisions, the federal courts began to
change their once prevalent view that procedural requirements were
no more stringent in capital cases than in cases involving the imposition of less severe penalties.17 8 State courts have also responded to
the general principles laid out in Furman and Gregg. The procedural
rules and precedents of the various states reflect the acceptance of
the notion that appellate courts have a special duty to review the
trial record for reversible error in death penalty cases. 179 It is apparent, then, that the precept lying at the core of Furman and
Gregg,'8 0 which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court as well as
by various federal and state courts, now plays a significant role in
the determination of constitutionally administered capital punishment proceedings.
V.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ABANDONMENT OF THE NOTION THAT
"DEATH iS DIFFERENT"

Regardless of the Court's earlier assertions that death is a
unique penalty, therefore entitling capital defendants greater procedural protections than noncapital defendants, the Court has recently indicated a willingness to abandon this concern. Recent
judicial activity seems to reflect an attempt by Court opponents of
habeas review to create procedural formulations in an effort to deny
access to such federal review. Prior to such cases as Barefoot v. Estelle, i 81 Wainwright v. Witt,18 2 Strickland v. Washington,18 3 and Smith v.
Murray,18 4 this Court would not have tolerated such formulations in
the context of death penalty cases. These new formulations must
177 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983). But see Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 892 n.3
(where it is stated that Congress inserted the requirement that a prisoner first obtain a
certificate of probable cause to appeal). See H.R. REP. No. 23, 60th Cong., Ist Sess., at 1
(1908) (concern over the increasing number of frivolous habeas corpus petitions challenging capital sentences which delayed execution pending completion of the appellate
process was also expressed) Id. at 2.
178 See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227 (1 1th Cir. 1982) ("the view once prevalent that the procedural requirements applicable to capital sentencing are no more rigorous than those governing noncapital sentencing decisions ... is no longer valid");
Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d at 1346, 1357, (5th Cir. 1981) (the seriousness of the
sentence faced by the defendant is a factor that must be considered in determining
counsel's adequacy of representation).
179 See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 548 n.20 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180 The Court reaffirmed this precept in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
181 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
182 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
183 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
184 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
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therefore reflect the impatience, expressed by some members of the
Court, with lengthy execution delays attributable to federal habeas
corpus proceedings.
A.

BAREFOOT V. ESTELLE

185
In order to fully understand the ramifications of Barefoot, it is
first necessary to discuss the workings of the certificate of probable
cause. The habeas statute provides for review of a district judge's
order denying an application for habeas corpus on appeal "by the
18 6
court of appeals for the circuit where the proceeding is had."
However, "[a]n appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals ...
unless the justice or judge who rendered the order or circuit justice
or judge issues a certificate of probable cause."' 187 In order for a
prisoner to obtain a certificate of probable cause, a petitioner must
make a "substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right.'"188
Consequently, once the certificate has been issued, section 2253 as
well as decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that a prisoner is
entitled to a review and decision on the merits of his or her appeal. 189 Thus, although section 2253 removed the requirement of
automatically staying proceedings against a prisoner, pending his
appeal, Congress clearly left intact the requirement that upon obtaining the certificate, the court must grant a stay of execution to the
capital defendant. 190 The decisions of the Supreme Court prior to
1983, emphasizing the significance of the issuance of a certificate of
probable cause, give rise to this conclusion as well. 19 1 To hold
otherwise serves only to diminish the stated significance of the certificate of probable cause. 192 If there is probable cause to appeal,
185 463 U.S. at 880.
186 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982).
187 Id.
188 Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Harris v. Ellis, 204
F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1953)).
189 See Boaz, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Penalty Cases in the
FederalCourts, 95 YALE LJ. 349, 350 n.4 (1985); see also Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S.
542 (1967) (holding that summary denial of a habeas petition after issuance of certificate
of probable cause); Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464 (1968) (remanded for further
consideration of appeal on merits after court of appeals summarily affirmed district
court's denial of habeas corpus and continued the stay of execution pending the appeal);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (vacated lower courts order because there was
no indication that the appeal had been "duly considered on its merits" as required by
Nawakowski, when a certificate of probable cause was granted); but see Barefoot, 463 U.S.
at 890-91 (the Court reconciles with these prior cases the procedures followed by the
court of appeals).
190 See Boaz, supra note 189, at 358 n.52.
191 Id. 2.
192 Brooks v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1061, 1063 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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carrying out a capital sentence before a decision on the merits is
reached renders the certificate meaningless as applied to capital defendants because the appeal becomes moot. 193 The Court's decision in Barefoot not only "tampers with a question long settled by
congressional action," 194 but it also eviscerates its own prior
holdings.
In Barefoot,19 5 the Supreme Court approved the Fifth Circuit's
treatment of stay applications in'death penalty cases as equivalent to
stay applications in civil litigation cases.'19 Instead of automatically
granting a stay of execution, the Fifth Circuit required the petitioner
to make an affirmative showing of success on the merits upon securing a certificate of probable cause. 19 7 The court arrived at this decision by relying on precedent involving stay applications in a
prisoner's rights class acion-a case that would not become moot
regardless of the outcome of the applications. 1 9 8 What the Fifth
Circuit and the Supreme Court both failed to consider is that even if
such a denial of staying procedures was appropriate in that context,
it is inapplicable to situations in which the denial results in execution before final determination of the appeal.
For many of those executed since the Barefoot decision, an order
of the Supreme Court denying a stay of execution extinguished judicial review. 199 The Supreme Court seemed to justify this result by
its further holding in Barefoot that federal circuit courts can properly
decide the merits of a nonfrivilous federal habeas corpus appeal,
brought by a state prisoner sentenced to death, while ruling on his
motion for a stay of execution. 20 0 This proves questionable after
examining how the court of appeals "fully considered the merits" of
Barefoot's appeal simultaneously with his application for a stay. As
Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent in Barefoot, it is simply not
true to "say that the court of appeals ruled on the merits of the appeal.' "201 If this assertion were true, it would seem an incredible
feat considering the fact that the court had less than a day to review
the voluminous record. 20 2 Moreover, the court had less than 24
193
194
195
196

See Boaz, supra note 189, at 350.
Id. at 358 n.52.
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
See Boaz, supra note 189, at 351 n.9.

197 Id.

Id.
199 Id. at 352.
200 463 U.S. at 889-90.
201 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 891
198

(1983)).
202

See Boaz, supra note 189, at 351 n.12.
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hours to study the vast array of case law relevant to Barefoot's appeal-all this without the benefit of full briefing and argument by
the parties. 20 3 The more plausible conclusion came from Justice
Marshall who stated that what the court did conclude and was only
capable of concluding, with the papers before it, was that the "likelihood of petitioner's prevailing on the merits was insufficient to justify the delay that would result from staying his execution pending

the disposition of his appeal. '20 4 Yet the Supreme Court, in a death
penalty case, condones the substitution of a hasty consideration of
the merits of a "concededly substantial constitutional" claim for an
actual ruling by the court of appeals in accord with its ordinary
20 5
procedures.
The Supreme Court has failed to advance any reasons for its
approval of such expedited procedures in capital cases. Nevertheless, the Court probably relied on the various policy considerations
underlying its previous procedural formulations restricting federal
habeas review. As one commentator has suggested, three arguments are generally articulated when imposing restrictions to
habeas review: 1) federal habeas corpus generates friction between
federal and state courts, 2) it strains federal judicial resources, and
3) federal habeas corpus undermines the desire for finality in crimi20 6
nal proceedings.
With regard to use of summary proceedings, many appellate
courts have recognized that time constraints on a motion for a stay
simply preclude the necessary time needed to inquire into the merits of an appeal. The Fourth Circuit noted in Shaw v. Martin,20 7 that
"[i]n the very nature of proceedings on a motion for a stay of execution, the limited record coupled with the time constraints imposed
by imminence of execution preclude any fine-tuned inquiry into the
actual merits." 20 8 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Dobbert v. Strickland 20 9 pointed out that "[b]ecause the brief period of time between
the filing of this appeal and the scheduled execution is insufficient to
consider properly the merits of the issues raised, this [c]ourt must
2 10
stay the execution of the death sentence."
Members of the Supreme Court have further commented on
203

Id.

463 U.S. at 909-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 911 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See Capital Punishmment, supra note 173, at 1208.
613 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1980).
208 Id. at 492.
209 670 F.2d 938 (1 Ith Cir. 1982).
210 Id. at 940.
204 Barefoot,
205
206
207
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the failure of expedited review to provide adequate review. 2 1 ' The
principles underlying the approaches taken in such cases as Shaw
and Dobbert provide "nothing more or less than the process necessary to assure that a death sentenced inmate has his or her properly
preserved federal constitutional claims determined once on the
merits by the federal judiciary." 2 12 The approach now taken to stay
applications, as a result of the Supreme Court's Barefoot decision,
presents a risk that some death-sentenced prisoners whose habeas
corpus appeals would have succeeded will nonetheless be executed
without an appeal. This approach is unacceptable in view of the fact
that, while states suffer no irreparable harm in allowing a death-sentenced prisoner's first federal habeas corpus appeal to be heard on
the merits, the prisoner's harm will be irreparable absent a
hearing.213
The unacceptability of such irreparable harm resulting from
these expedited procedures has led at least one circuit, which has a
particularly strong interest in the proper handling of death penalty
habeas corpus cases, 2 14 to attempt to circumvent the harshness of
the Barefoot approach to stay applications. The Eleventh Circuit has
made this attempt through its formulation of rules governing expedited procedures for habeas corpus death penalty cases. These
rules provide strict guidelines delineating what will satisfy the Barefoot requirement of "considering the merits. ' 2 15 Furthermore, the
rules establish that the delay avoided by expedited procedures will
not automatically warrant departure from the normal, untruncated
processes of appellate review when a case of first habeas corpus ap2 16
peal is involved.
211 Wainwright v.Adams, 466 U.S. 964, 965 (1984) (Marshall,J., dissenting from vacation of stay) ("[tihe haste and confusion surrounding this decision is degrading"); Stephens v. Kemp, 469 U.S. 1043, 1058 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of stay)

(Court's denial of stay is "result orientation carried to its most cynical extreme").
AsJustice Marshall has described, "The Supreme Court has authorized the review-

ing courts to put [the habeas] proceedings on fast forward.... When the process speeds
up, the opportunity for deliberation, consideration and rebuttal vanishes. The proceedings collapse into each other and the appellate process loses its vitality.'" Boaz, supra
note 189, at 367 n.91 (quotingJustice Marshall, Remarks to the Second Circuit Conference in Hershey, Pa. (Sept. 6, 1985)).
212 See Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc. at 41,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
213 Id. at 17-18.
214 See Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1505 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The
number of prisoners under death sentence in the United States is approximately 1,100
to 1,200. Approximately one-third of these are in the three states of the Eleventh
Circuit.")
215 llth Cir. R. 30.
216 Id.
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Another consequence of the Barefoot approach to staying applications that should render it unacceptable is its exacerbation of the
risk that a meritorious claim of a condemned person will go undetected due to inadequate legal representation. It has already been
established that capital inmates are often represented by unpaid vol2 17
unteer sole practitioners with limited resources and facilities.
Such attorneys who often lack specialized competence in capital litigation may also lack the time needed to acquaint themselves with
the relevant law.2 18 This situation is not likely to improve since, as
the numbers on death row rise, federal habeas corpus appeals will
rise as well. These facts, coupled with the hurried nature of proceedings on stay applications, will cause even more experienced
practitioners to overlook factual or legal authority which might save
the life of a death-sentenced prisoner.2 1 9 The added burdens
placed on these practitioners by the expedited schedules involved in
summary proceedings will make mistakes of this sort unavoidable.
Perhaps the irony of the Court's endorsement of the summary
proceedings established in Barefoot, in light of its reiterated concern
that condemned prisoners not be put to death without full consideration of the constitutionality of the proceedings, is best articulated
by the question posed in an NAACP Brief:
Why should the circumstance that the state has unilaterally chosen to
set an execution date which deprives a Federal Appellate Court of the
time necessary for its usual measure of deliberate reflection be permitted to harry it into giving the most truncated consideration to cases
2 20
with the most momentous consequences?

The Court's evident willingness to disregard its earlier concerns is
best demonstrated by the outright modification of acknowledged
views by individual members of the Supreme Court. For instance,
Justice Stevens once criticized a proposal to "grant certiorari and
decide the merits of every capital case," which "would preclude federal district courts from granting writs of habeas corpus [in those
cases] on any ground that had been presented to and rejected by
[the Supreme Court]." 2 2' The obvious purpose of this proposal was
to expedite the administration of the death penalty. Justice Stevens'
reasoning for rejecting such a proposal was expressed in Coleman v.
217 See Habeas Corpus-Expedited Appellate Review of Habeas Corpus Petitions Brought by
Death-Sentenced State Prisoners, 74 Sup. CT. REv. 1404, 1421 (1983) (citing Brief of Amicus
Curiae American Bar Association at 21, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)).
218 Id.
219 See BriefofAmicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc. at 17,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
220 Id.
221 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 950 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Balkcom, 2 22 where he stated: "[flor after all, death cases are indeed
different in kind from all other litigation. The penalty, once imposed, is irrevocable. In balance, therefore, I think the Court wisely
declines to select this group of cases in which to experiment with
accelerated procedures. ' 2 23 Yet this is precisely what the Court
224
condoned in Barefoot.
,B.

WITHERSPOON V. ILLINOIS TO WAINWRIGHT V. WITT

The sixth amendment entitles a criminal defendant to trial by
an impartial jury.2 2 5 However, what constitutes an adequate representation of an impartial jury differs depending on whether the jury
will hear a capital or noncapital case. 22 6 In a noncapital case, where
the responsibility for imposing a sentence does not rest with the
jury, the mere existence of bias is usually sufficient to support the
exclusion of a juror. In a capital case, it becomes necessary for
judges to determine not only that the prospective juror opposes the
death penalty but that his feelings are so intense toward it that they
render him incapable of judging partially. 22 7 Therefore, the state
228
has the latitude to exclude jurors for cause in a noncapital case,
even if it later could be shown that the individual is capable of setting aside his prejudices in order to judge impartially because it
"disserves no interest of the defendant. ' 22 9 The same is not true
when allowing such broad exclusions of jurors in capital cases.
While "[n]o systemic skew in the nature ofjury composition results
from exclusion of individuals for random idiosyncratic traits likely to
lead to bias[,] . . .[e]xclusion of those opposed to capital punishment, by contrast, keeps an identifiable class of people off the jury
222 Id.
223 451 U.S. 949, 953 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). This statement

may be classified as mere dicta by some; however, it nevertheless indicates a willingness
by Supreme Court members to modify earlier views, once thought worthy of noting, in
later decisions. This is true even where the principles underlying such earlier views have
remained unchanged. But see supra note 438.

224 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
225 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1968) ("this jury fell woefully short

of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments").
226 A distinctive feature of capital trials in many states is that the jury determines the
sentence. Therefore, the process of jury selection gives rise to special problems in a
capital case because the views of prospective jurors concerning capital punishment become of paramount concern.
227 Carr, At Witt's End-- The ContinuingQuanday ofJuty Selection in CapitalCases, 39 STAN.
L. R. 427, 456-57 (1987).
228 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 441 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
229 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and is likely to systemically bias juries." 23 0
The Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois23 1 first recognized
that constitutional rights were being denied capital defendants when
prospective jurors with conscientious scruples against the death
penalty were automatically eliminated. The Court realized that a
jury vacant of all scrupled jurors did not create a representative jury
drawn from a "fair cross section of the community" but rather ajury
"uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die." 23 2 The Court reasoned that an "impartial jury" in a capital case should not exclude
those who oppose the death penalty as long as they could follow the
2 33
law and consider imposing the death penalty in a particular case.
The Witherspoon Court, in an effort to aid the decision of when a
scrupled juror could constitutionally be excluded from a capital
jury, set forth a two-pronged standard. The Court stated that veniremen could be excluded for cause if they made it "unmistakeably
clear" that: 1) they would automatically vote against the imposition
of capital punishment notwithstanding the evidence that might be
introduced at trial, or 2) their views concerning the death penalty
would prevent them from rendering an impartial decision as to the
defendant's guilt. 23 4 The Court found that this standard adequately
preserved the states' interest in efficient law enforcement while safeguarding defendants from partial juries. 2 35 Thus, after Witherspoon,
juries in capital trials began to reflect a more accurate representa23 6
tion of society.
Sixteen years later, in response to the dissatisfaction with the
Witherspoon rule, the Supreme Court in Witt 2 37 curtailed the rights of
230 Id. at 441-42 (Brennan, J.
231 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
232 Id. at 521.

dissenting).

233 Id.

Id. at 522-23 n.21.
Id. The state could still exclude prospective jurors if it is shown that they could
not vote for the death penalty; however, the state is held to a strict standard of proof.
236 As the Witherspoon Court observed, "[I]n a nation less than half of whose people
believe in the death penalty, ajury ...[c]ulled of all those who harbor doubts about the
wisdom of capital punishment.., can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority."
Id. at 519-20.
237 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). Proponents of the death penalty opposed the Witherspoon rule because it inhibited the states' ability to implement the death
penalty by placing them in a no win situation. If states were willing to risk allowing
prospective jurors steadfastly opposed to the death penalty to sit on the jury, they might
automatically lose the trial since most states require unanimity to impose a death sentence. See Carr, supra note 227, at 427 n.4. If the state did exclude these prospective
jurors, it runs the equally serious risk that if the jury returned a death verdict, it would
subsequently be overturned on appeal. Id. at 435. But see Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523
(Douglas, J., for the majority) (indicating that Witherspoon had not gone far enough to
234
235
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capital defendants by "clarifying" this rule. Witt, who received a
death sentence for murder, claimed in his habeas petition that the
trial judge violated Witherspoon by excusing a venireman who,
although indicating that she was afraid her views against capital
punishment would "interfere" with her deliberations, never stated
that she could not vote for the death penalty.2 38 The Court reversed the granting of habeas corpus and in so doing fashioned a
new standard significantly more lenient than the Witherspoon standard by which scrupled venireman could be excluded from capital
juries. 23 9 Presently, in order to exclude a juror based on his views
about capital punishment, the views must "prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with
his instructions and his oath."2 40 Justice Rehnquist has stated that
this is the proper standard for juror exclusion in capital cases "because it is in accord with traditional reasons for excluding
241
jurors."
If the Court's decision in Witt is premised on this position taken
by Justice Rehnquist, then at the very least the Court misconceives
the entire thrust of Witherspoon.2 42 In essence, the Witt Court, by
equating exclusion for bias in capital cases with exclusion for the
"innumerable other reasons which result in bias," permits death243
qualification to be evaluated under the same lenient standards.
The Witherspoon Court recognized that allowing for broad exclusions
of prospective capital jurors based on their views about capital punishment "infringes the rights of a capital defendant in a way that
ensure a capital defendant a trial by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of
the community).
238 Witt, 469 U.S. at 412.
239 Id. The Witt Court justified retreating from the Witherspoon Court's strict burden of
proof by finding that juries are no longer empowered with unlimited discretion when
determining sentences as in the days of Witherspoon; rather, after decisions such as
Furman and Gregg, their role has been reduced to answering specific factual questions
posed by thejudge. Therefore, the Court concluded that a broader standard for excludingjurors was required to ensure the exclusion of not onlyjurors who would "automatically" vote against a death verdict but jurors who were not likely to answer factual
questions truthfully as well. Id. at 421-22. But see Carr, supra note 227, at 454-55 (argu-

ing that the role of capital sentencing juries has not changed substantially: the
sentencers' decision hinges on a moral judgment based on a weighing of a wide range of
circumstances, not on objective factfinding).
240 Witt, 469 U.S. at 424. The Court relies on the language in Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38 (1980), allegedly broadening Witherspoon, tojustify a retreat from the Witherspoon

Court's restrictions. But see Witt, 469 U.S. at 450-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observes
that appellate courts reviewing Witherspoon claims, after Adams was decided, found it to
be a "clear endorsement of the Witherspoon approach").
241 Id. at 423.
242 Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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broad exclusion for indicia of other kinds of bias does not." 24 4 The
Witherspoon Court, in realizing that a significant degree of uncertainty will exist as to whether prospective jurors with scruples about
capital punishment should be excluded, concluded that the cost of
this uncertainty must be allocated to the state. 24 5 The necessity for
such a conclusion seems apparent, for as Justice Brennan noted:
"[T]he risks to a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights from ajury from
which those who oppose capital punishment have been excluded [are]
far more serious than the risk to the state from inclusion of particular
jurors whose views about the death
penalty might turn out to predis24 6
pose them toward the defendant.
This, coupled with the overriding interests of a defendant whose life
is at stake, certainly justifies placing the burden on the other party.
Nevertheless, the Court has chosen to debase the capital defendant's sixth amendment guarantees by shifting the risk of biased and
24 7
unrepresentative juries.
Witt proves significant to capital defendants as well due to its
holding that a trial court's determination of scrupled juror bias is a
finding of fact that deserves a presumption of correctness in accordance with section 2254(d). 2 48 The Court found Patton v. Yount, 249 a
noncapital case which expanded the scope of section 2254(d) to in250
clude a trial court's determination ofjuror bias, to be controlling.
In so doing, the Witt Court placed particular emphasis on the fact
that only the trial court has the advantage of taking demeanor evidence into account. 2 5 1 However, the Court, while recognizing that a
trial court still must apply a legal standard to an historical fact in
determining juror bias, nevertheless rejected the conclusion that
logically follows-the question becomes one of mixed law and fact
and consequently the presumption should not apply. 25 2 The net result, then, of the Court's decision in Witt is to promote the state's
ability to compile death-qualified juries in capital trials at the exat 441.
at 444.
246 Id. at 445.
247 Id. at 453.
248 Wainright
244 Id.
245 Id.

v. Witt, 469 U.S. 421, 429 (1985).
249 Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
250 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
251 Witt, 469 U.S. at 428.
252 See Id. at 429 (Justice Rehnquist stated, "[T]he trial judge is of course applying
some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears"); see also Patton, 461 U.S at 1052
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "the question whether a juror has an opinion that
disqualifies is a mixed one of law and fact"). Many lower courts have characterized a
judge's decision to disqualify a juror based on bias as a mixed question of law and fact.
See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1230
(1984); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 40 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983).
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pense of curtailing capital defendants' sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Moreover, the Witt Court's "equivocating of all juror
bias," allowing for a mixed question of law and fact, even in a capital
case, to lie within the parameters of section 2254(d), further indicates the Court's willingness to retreat from its proclamation that
special precautions be taken in capital trials to ensure that the death
253
penalty is accurately administered.
C.

STRICKLAND V

WASHINGTON

The determination of which attorney failures fall within the parameters of a sixth amendment claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel has special significance for the capital defendant. In Strickland,25 4 the Supreme Court attempted to enunciate what sort of attorney behavior would rise to the level of a sixth amendment
violation. The Court held that in order to succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show that
her attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and then must show that "but for this deficiency, a
reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would
have been different. ' 25 5 This latter requirement is known as the
Strickland prejudice requirement. The Court ruled that this standard
is-applicable to both noncapital trials and to the guilt and sentencing
phases of capital trials.256
The Court's insistence on equating capital sentencing proceedings with ordinary trials is one of the most critical deficiencies of the
Strickland decision as applied to capital defendants. The role of defense counsel in criminal cases is unquestionably a vital component
of the adversary system ofjustice. 2 57 However, due to the constitutionally required special procedures in capital trials and the uniqueness of the penalty itself, defense counsel must bear additional
responsibilities in capital trials unlike those found in other criminal
253 The Witt Court's "retreat" in regard to the application of § 2254(d) may not prove
as effective in limiting federal habeas review of these claims as first thought. Federal
reviewing courts are not bound by the presumption of correctness if they conclude that
the factual determination (in this case, the judge's decision to exclude a juror based on
bias) was not fairly supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). It seems probable that since the record will often contain testimony that conflicts with the trial judge's
decision to exclude, federal reviewing courts will persist in overturning death sentences
due to improper handling ofjury selection procedures. See Carr, supra note 227, at 444.
254 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
255 Id. at 688-89.
256 Id. at 687.

257 Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life:
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 317 (1983).
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trials. 258 The existence of a penalty phase in capital trials alone
drastically differentiates them from ordinary criminal trials.2 59 By
having two trials in a capital case, one to determine guilt or innocence and one to determine penalty, a capital attorney must try each
phase of the trial differently since trials focusing on whether a convicted defendant should live or die radically differ in both form and
issues addressed from those focusing on the commission of a
crime. 2 60 Moreover, it has been indicated that due to the complex2 61
ity of death penalty defenses, the field has become specialized.
The cumulative effect of these factors may serve as justification for
2 62
holding capital attorneys to a higher standard of performance.
The necessity for such a conclusion is evidenced by the fact that
experienced criminal trial counsel, while completely competent to
try an intricate criminal case, is not equally competent in handling a
penalty trial in a capital case. 263 The specialized nature of the death
penalty defense should also serve to justify a retreat from the Strickland Court's "strong presumption" of attorney competence in capital cases. 264 This presumption, in effect, requires reviewing courts
to find that, irrespective of what an attorney does or does not do,
the attorney's actions or omissions result from strategically reasonable decisions; therefore, they are rendered competent. 26 5 Particu2 66
larly in capital cases, this is simply not always true.
At the penalty phase of trial, an indispensable function of defense counsel is to portray the defendant as a human being by
Id.
Id. at 303.
Id.
See Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461,
491 (1987).
262 Id. at nn. 181-82.
263 See Goodpaster, supra note 257.
264 Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 72-78 (1986); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (arguing that in order to prevent second guessing of
counsel's actions, a reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that the challenged action was based on "sound trial strategy").
265 See Goodpaster, supra note 264, at 78; see, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 186 (1986) ("there are several reasons why counsel reasonably would have chosen
to rely on a simple plea for mercy from petitioner himself" after learning that trial counsel afforded only a half hour preparing mitigating evidence); Woratzek v. Ricketts, 799
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1986) (attorney's decision not to call potential witnesses at penalty
phase of trial was deemed a strategical judgment and not unreasonable); see also Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395, 404 (11th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738,
746-47 (11th Cir. 1985).
266 See Goodpaster, supra note 257, at 303-304 n.22, 337 n.151; see also Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the JudicialConference of the Second Circuit, 86 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1,2 (1986).
258
259
260
261
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presenting favorable mitigating evidence to thejury. 26 7 By presenting such evidence, counsel attempts to convince the jury that,
although guilty, the defendant is nonetheless worthy of living.2 68 As
indicated in one death penalty defense manual, "It is extremely easy
for a jury to vote to kill a sack of cement. It is much more difficult
for them to kill a human being. '2 69 If this evidence is not introduced, the penalty phase becomes essentially meaningless. The
Court in Strickland, a capital case specifically dealing with the issue of
an attorney's failure to present such evidence, stated that the key in
judging a claim of ineffectiveness is to decide "whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result." 2 70 A sentencing hearing in which the sentencer must reach
a decision based solely on the aggravating circumstances offered by
the state gives the sentencer "one-sided and incomplete information" and no basis for exercising mercy. 2 71 Such a sentencing hearing eviscerates the function of the adversarial system and
undermines the established standards requiring reliability in capital
sentencing. 27 2 In Strickland, the Court did indicate that failure to
present mitigating evidence may result from an attorney's reasonable strategical decision. 273 However, several courts have refused to
characterize as ineffective the conduct of attorneys who completely
2 74
fail to investigate and present this evidence at the penalty phase.
Moreover, the Strickland prejudice requirement appears inconsistent with the Supreme Court's death penalty law. While a reviewing court's determination as to whether a "fair and accurate" result
was produced at trial may prove relevant to a trial at which the central issue is a "factual inquiry into whether the defendant committed
any crimes," it proves irrelevant at the capital sentencing trial where
no factual determination is involved. 275 Rather than focusing on a
factual inquiry, the penalty phase of a capital trial focuses on the
highly moralistic issue of whether the defendant should live or
die. 2 76 As one commentator observed:
The capital sentencing decision primarily involves a weighing of val267 Goodpaster, supra note 257, at 317-18.
268 Id.
269 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, TRIAL OF THE PENALTY PiASE
270 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
271 See Fong, supra note 261, at 480.
272 Id.
273 466 U.S. at 699.
274 See Fong, supra note 261, at 479 n.123.
275 Id. at 486.
276 See Goodpaster, supra note 264.

(1981).
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ues; it is not a fact determination. It makes little sense to speak of an
"accurate" or "correct" death sentence. A death sentence may only
be "appropriate" or 'just", in the sense that anyone hearing the evidence and27 argument
on the issue might feel such a sentence
7
warranted.

In accordance with Lockett, experienced counsel, by presenting
mitigating evidence that may at first seem insignificant-such as the
defendant's being abused as a child or evidence of the defendant's
compassion for others-has often succeeded in returning a life verdict. 2 78 In this light, if a defendant challenges a sentencing hearing
where no mitigating evidence was introduced, a court concluding
that "no reasonable jury would have been influenced by this evidence" seems to misunderstand the Court's requirement that the
penalty stage provide for an individualized sentencing hearing. 2 79
Appellate courts deemed "wholly ill-suited to evaluate the appropriateness of death in the first instance due to their inability to confront and examine the individuality of the defendant" are now, in
reviewing habeas claims, substituting their judgment for that of the
sentencer who would have decided the issue in the "first
280
instance."
The Strickland standard is also deficient in aiding courts' determination of ineffective assistance claims raised by capital defendants
in this context because upon deciding these claims they remain unarmed not only of the mitigating evidence a diligent attorney would
have uncovered but also of the effect such evidence would have had
on the jury. 28 ' Nevertheless, Strickland requires reviewing courts to
do this. 2 82 In essence, courts predicting the impact of unpresented
evidence are merely reassessing the evidence of the capital defendant's often substantial guilt. 28 3 Thus, as the vast majority of cases
following the Strickland Court's lead indicate, the outcome-that
counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence will
nonetheless constitute effective assistance of counsel-becomes
277 Id. at 83.

278 See Fong, supra note 261, at 487.
279 Id.
280 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985)
olina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)).
281 See Fong, supra note 261, at 488.

(citing Woodson v. North Car-

282 Id.

283 Id. at 489. The Strickland Court seemed to do just this. Although calling the attorney's failure to present mitigating evidence a reasonable strategic choice, the Court also
noted counsel's sense of hopelessness as to ihe possibility of saving the defendant's life
because of the strong evidence against him. It therefore appears that the prejudice test
allows trial counsel to be less diligent in the very cases which seem to call for a greater
degree of effort on behalf of the defendant. See Goodpaster, supra note 264.
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predictable. 28 4
Assuming the Strickland standard for effective assistance of
counsel arose in response to an apparent need to balance the state's
interest in finality against society's interest in providing fair trials to
those accused of crimes, it may prove to be a valid method for satisfying this need when applied to noncapital trials. 285 However, in the
context of capital cases, courts conducting direct and post-conviction review proceedings must contend with a mass of seemingly irreconcilable standards. The Supreme Court has established that,
due to the uniqueness of the death penalty, the Constitution requires that a capital defendant be afforded certain procedural protections. 2 86 Among these procedural protections are reliability and
individualization in a capital sentencing hearing in which the defendant has the right to present any mitigating evidence to the jury
that may save his life. These specialized procedures impose upon
defense counsel functions "definably different from counsel in ordinary criminal cases." 28 7 Yet the Supreme Court, through its Strickland decision, requires these lower courts to neutrally apply a
uniform standard in determining ineffective assistance of counsel
claims which, due to the unlikelihood of attaining habeas relief by
satisfying this standard, may cause irreparable harm to capital
defendants.
The way to reconcile this confusion is not by closing the door to
collateral review, a necessary means by which capital defendants can
vindicate their right to effective assistance of counsel; rather, the answer lies in recognizing that, because attorneys are required to perform different functions in capital cases, defining what constitutes
"reasonably competent counsel" must also differ in these cases. 28 8
284 Fong, supra note 261, at 489. However, a sympathetic court can easily manipulate
such an open-ended standard if it wants to grant relief. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Kemp, 615
F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 781 F.2d 1482 (1986) (granting habeas relief where
defense counsel failed to present mitigating testimony at sentencing); Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532 (1 Ith Cir. 1983) (habeas relief granted when counsel indicated a
lack of understanding on how to present mitigating evidence and failed to do so).
285 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-4 (1984). The Court stated, "The
standard also reflects the profound importance of finality in criminal proceedings." See
also Fong, supra note 261, at 485. The standard if set too low will result in sentence
reversals for minute errors by defense counsel, yet if the standard is set too high, defendants may be deprived of a fair trial.
286 See supra note 172.
287 See Goodpaster, supra note 257, at 360.
288 See Fong, supra note 261, at 490 (proposes that capital defense counsel be held to a
standard of performance comporting with experienced counsel in death penalty trials
and that failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence is presumed unreasonable
and prejudicial). There may be certain cases where it is a reasonable judgment not to
present mitigating evidence. However, it still must be determined if counsel engaged in
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It is not enough to conclude that counsel acted effectively during
the guilt phase of the trial;28 9 counsel's representation must also be
measured at the penalty phase. More specifically, the Court must
assess counsel's conduct in regard to the particular investigative and
trial practices necessary to protect the defendant's rights.2 9 0 Otherwise, capital defendants are being denied a fair and adversarial sentencing hearing as well as their sixth amendment right to effective
counsel. In this light, the Strickland decision becomes just as difficult
to reconcile with the Court's prior pronouncements guaranteeing
heightened procedural safeguards to capital defendants.
D.

SYNTHESIZING BAREFOOT, WI7T, AND STRICKLAND

Some troubling implications in regard to the direction of capital
punishment jurisprudence emerge from these decisions. Barefoot
seems to stand for the proposition that less process is due capital
defendants because death is different and it is time to rectify the
problem of overcrowding on death rows. 2 9 ' In the alternative, Witt
and Strickland, by their failure to differentiate capital cases from noncapital cases, where clearly distinct procedural issues come into
play, suggest that there is to be no more process afforded to capital
defendants than that of noncapital litigants.2 9 2 These propositions
would not prove so disturbing perhaps if it were not for the fact that
not too long ago, the Court, in monitoring death sentences, primarily focused on the procedures by which death sentences were imposed.2 93 The Court in Barefoot, by creating expedient procedures
for the sake of accommodating capital punishment, drastically undermines the aura of reliability surrounding sentences imposed
under such procedures. The Court in Witt and Strickland, by applying open ended standards to determine the effectiveness of counsel
and the propriety of excluding certain death penalty opponents
from sitting on juries, rather than those specifically structured to
accommodate the specialized procedures involved in capital cases,
an investigation to discover this evidence in order to serve as a basis for making the
decision. See Goodpaster, supra note 264, at 84 n. 116.
289 See Goodpaster, supra note 257, at 360-61.
290 Id.
291 Geimer, Death at any Cost: A Critiqueof the Supreme Court'sRecent Retreatfrom its Death
Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 737, 762 (1985).
292 Id.
293 See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion).
The Court indicates that in light of the procedural rights involved, claims of capital
defendants should be process-oriented and not result-oriented. See Fong, supra note

261, at 490.
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opens the door to arbitrary application of the death penalty. 2 94 In
earlier days, death sentences inflicted as a result of arbitrary and
unreliable procedures led the Court to conclude that capital punishment was unconstitutional when imposed under such procedures. 2 95
Although the risk of arbitrariness and unreliability created by Barefoot, Witt, and Strickland is not identical to that found in Furman and
its progeny, the result of imposing death sentences in accordance
with today's procedures may nevertheless push capital punishment
"toward the precipice of unconstitutionality." 2 96
VI.

PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS AND DEATH PENALTY CASES

The arguments indicating disapproval of the recent limitations
restricting liberal allowance of federal habeas review take on special
significance in criminal cases that involve the death penalty. This is
especially true since many of the Court's concerns in establishing
these limitations are not relevant to death penalty cases. Additionally, death penalty cases often pose certain problems that are absent
from noncapital cases.
For example, the Supreme Court has previously indicated the
importance of the state's right to convict and sentence its criminals
without federal interference, thereby promoting judicial comity.
The importance of this right was emphasized in Rose v. Lundy, 29 7 a
noncapital case. 2 98 "State interests, however, cannot always prevail
over the defendant's interest in meaningful enforcement of constitutional rights." 2 9 9 In capital cases, federal and state courts should be
particularly willing to allow this concern for comity to succumb to
the overriding interest of state and federal governments in preserving the lives of their citizens.3 0 0 Although it may be appropriate to
restrict federal habeas review in the interest of limiting undue federal interference in state affairs when the petitioner only faces a
prison term, it would seem inappropriate when the petitioner faces
execution.3 0 1 Moreover, even if, as Justice Stevens noted, "the interest in imposing the death sentence is essentially a state interest,"3 0° 2 federal courts still "have a compelling interest in ensuring
that states impose the death penalty in a constitutionally permissible
294 See Carr,supra note 227, at 448-49.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 448.
297 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
298 See supra notes 55 & 147-48 and accompanying text.
299 See CapitalPunishment, supra note 173, at 1210.

300 Id. at 1209.
301 Id. at 1210.
302 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 950 (1981) (order denying certiorari).
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fashion." 3 0 3
Liberal allowance of federal habeas review has also been attacked on the grounds that the federal court has an interest in relieving itself from the drain on judicial resources resulting from the
filing of habeas corpus petitions with the Supreme Court. 30 4 This
interest may be justified by the fact that many of the claims in habeas
corpus cases have been previously considered by various courts.3 0 5
The use of expedited review,as approved by the Supreme Court in
Barefoot, may be a particularly valuable way to remedy this concern.
However, while it is true that these summary proceedings will inevitably result in the Court's ability to handle a larger number of cases,
such a quantitative increase may prove unjustifiable if it reduces the
reliability of the review by requiring federal courts to give less consideration to the merits of these cases.3 0 6 In death penalty cases this
risk may violate the principles espoused in Furman and its progeny.
One final note is that basing justification of summary proceedings
on notions of judicial expense simply ignores the evidence indicating that many of these death penalty habeas corpus cases are
3 07
meritorious.
The Court has consistently stressed its concern over the need
for finality in criminal proceedings to justify dispensing with the
procedural protections afforded by federal habeas corpus. 3 0 8 The
See Capital Punishment, supra note 173, at 1210.
See Weick, supra note 117, at 747-748; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,
453 n.16 (1986) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982) ("unlimited availability of federal collateral attack burdens our criminal justice system as successive petitions divert the time of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers' from the important task of
trying criminal cases")).
305 Justice Powell observed:
When raised on federal habeas, a claim generally has been considered by two or
more tiers of state courts. It is the solemn duty of these courts, no less than federal
ones, to safeguard personal liberties and consider federal claims in accord with federal law. The task which federal courts are asked to perform on habeas is thus most
often one that has or should have been done before. The presumption that "if ajob
can be well done once, it should not be done twice" is sound and one calculated to
utilize best "the intellectual, moral and political resources involved in the legal
system."
Habeas Corpus - ExpeditedAppellate Review of Habeas Corpus PetitionsBrought by Death-Sentenced
State Prisoners, 74 SUPR. CT. REV. 1404, 1423 (1983) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973)).
306 See supra notes 207-211 and accompanying text. This has been the very concern
raised by some commentators and Supreme Court Justices.
307 See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
308 See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 528 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453-4 n.16 (1986) (quoting Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments,38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 148-49 (1970));
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 n.32 (quoting Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and
FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 (1963)).
303
304
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Barefoot decision seemed to reveal a specific concern that capital defendants will use federal habeas corpus "to delay an execution indefinitely. '8 0 9 This may be attributable to the fact that, unlike
noncapital defendants, capital defendants gain little benefit from expediting the process.8 10 However, if the Court's concern for delay is
particularly accented in capital cases due to a special incentive on
11
the part of capital defendants to engage in piecemeal litigation,
requiring a petitioner to exhaust state remedies is even less workable in achieving this goal than it is in noncapital cases. Perhaps the
better approach, in furtherance of this goal, would be to permit the
states to waive exhaustion. 12 Regardless of the validity of the
Court's concern for such delays in capital cases, it is* significantly
minimized in light of the fact that these cases present a unique need
for delay. 31 This is evident because noncapital defendants can begin to serve their sentence before appeals are reviewed, while capital defendants obviously cannot do the same. 1 4 Additionally, some
members of the Supreme Court and some commentators have
noted that the delays that occur between imposition of the death
3 15
sentence and execution are unavoidable.
While it may be conceded that the state's interest in finality is
sufficient to justify limiting federal habeas corpus for noncapital deBarefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
See Morris, supra note 38, at 377 nn.45-46 and accompanying text ("Capital defendants, on the other hand gain little advantage from expediting the process. Since
most capital defendants do not contest their convictions, but only their sentence, a victory on appeal usually means a life sentence.").
811 See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 895 ("To the extent that these [successive petitions] involve the danger that a condemned inmate might attempt to use repeated petitions and
appeals as a mere delaying tactic, the State has quite a legitimate interest in preventing
such abuses of the writ.").
812 See Thomas V. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1506 n.10 (11th Cir. 1983) (suggested
that while permitting waiver of exhaustion furthers the interest in finality and the avoidance of piecemeal litigation, an alternative approach "which takes. into account the fact
that death is involved" would be to allow a continuance while petitioner exhausts his
own claims). But see Morris, supra note 38, at n.59.
818 See Morris, supra note 38, at 378.
814 Id. at 378 n.47.
815 Justice Stevens explains that given bifurcated punishment hearings, "post-trial
proceedings in trial court, direct and collateral review in the state judicial system, collateral review in the federal system, and clemency review... it seems inevitable that there
must be a significant period of incarceration on death row during the interval between
sentencing and execution." Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (StevensJ.,
concurring) (order denying certiorari). See Greenberg, CapitalPunishment as a System, 91
YALE LJ.908, 927 (1982), which states:
Whatever view one takes of thedeterrent capacity of the death penalty when it is the
swift and certain result of criminal activity, the current, roller coaster systemthough absolutely necessary to protect the innocent from execution, to safeguard
basic constitutional rights, and to avoid racially motivated executions-makes swift
and certain executions impossible.
809
810
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fendants, this interest is not sufficient to override the capital petitioner's interest in having his claims considered on the merits. This
insufficiency becomes evident when viewing the various states' actions in the death penalty area. It is first shown by the prevailing
practice in many states that courts have special obligations that attend the review of death penalties. 31 6 More importantly, it must be
stressed that the state courts themselves have generated the largest
number of reversals on a wide range of state law grounds. 31 7 It has
been recognized that all states cannot possibly have the same interest in accelerating the execution rate. 318 Moreover, this notion of
the need for finality in judgment is hardly a novel concern. In essence, then, the states' interest in finality argument merely acts as a
scapegoat to justify the Court's primary mission-to bar federal
habeas review for capital defendants.
Moreover, this unique need for delay in capital cases has led to
the misconceived view that death-sentenced defendants intentionally withhold claims and raise them successively. 3 19 However, Justice Brennan has previously criticized this fear of intentional
delay.3 20 The argument that lawyers would not risk forfeiting claims
by intentionally withholding them is particularly applicable to death
penalty cases because a lawyer is even less apt to take such a risk
when a life is at stake. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's more recent indication of its desire to restrict successive petitions 3 21 provides even less incentive to intentionally withhold claims.
In addition, the Court, by allowing for summarily dismissing
successive petitions in capital cases, ignores that in the area of capital successive petitions there exists an especially critical need for a
relaxation of the standards applied to successive habeas petitions in
316 See supra note

179.
State law grounds include the following: conviction of a crime different from that
charged in the indictment, failure to charge concerning the availability of witnesses, admission of hearsay evidence, refusal to sever the trial of two defendants when counsel
has a conflict of interest, failure to sequester the jury, misunderstanding about plea bargain agreements, and prosecutorial vindictiveness for refusal to plea bargain. See Greenberg, supra note 315, at 921-22.
318 Justice Stevens stated in Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 950 (1981):
Because the persons on death row are concentrated in only a few States, because
some States have no capital punishment at all, and because the range of capital
offenses differs in different States, it is quite clear that all States do not share the
same interest in accelerating the execution rate.
317

319 See Morris, supra note 38, at 378.

320 See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
321 See Morris, supra note 38, at 388 & n.84 and accompanying text (where it is argued
that because courts are no longer lenient towards successive petitions, withholding
claims is not sound judgment).
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the noncapital case. 322 This is due to the unique procedural situation which arises for capital defendants, sometimes forcing them to
use successive habeas petitions.3 23 As a result of the Court's decision in Lundy,3 24 all claims presented in a federal habeas petition
must first be presented and ruled upon in the state courts.3 25 The
frequent result from the interaction of state and federal ruleg is the
state courts' refusal to stay an execution date, which forces the defendant to request a stay from the federal courts by filing a habeas
petition.3 2 6 However, the requirement of exhaustion prevents the
defendant from bringing all valid claims into federal court in the
first petition if the state courts have not completed their review
3 27
simultaneously.
The capital defendant is therefore faced with two choices: 1)
request a stay, resulting in execution, or 2) request a stay on some
but not all claims or raise them successively.3 28 The federal court's
new approach to successive petitions, however, following the lead
set by the Supreme Court,3 29 provides for the possible dismissal of
any issue raised on successive petitions. The capital defendant must
therefore involuntarily forego constitutional claims whether meritorious or not; if he chooses to exhaust all of his claims, he runs the
substantial risk that he will not be alive to pursue them. In this light,
the capital defendant is provided with less protection than the noncapital defendant.3 3 0 While the noncapital defendant can wait for
the exhaustion of claims before entering federal court, the capital
defendant is forced into federal court early to avoid execution. As
Justice Frankfurter noted, "The complexities of our federalism and
the workings of a scheme of government involving the interplay of
two governments, one of which is subject to limitations enforceable
by the other, are not to be escaped by simple, rigid rules, which by
33
avoiding some abuses, generate others." '
The Court's new approach to successive petitions creates fur322 Id. at 379-80 & nn.50-53.
323 Id.
324 Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
325 Id. at 522.
326 See Morris, supra note 38, at 379.
327 Id.

328 Id. at 380.
329 See Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 442 U.S. 906 (1979) (denying stay of execution).
330 It should be noted that the severity of the Sanders limitations proves less detrimen-

tal to the noncapital petitioner. He or she has the opportunity to return to court years
after the conviction and successfully raise new or unadjudicated challenges to incarceration. See Hobbs v. Pepersack, 206 F. Supp. 301 (D. Md. 1962) (granting relief on eight
federal habeas petitions). This is not so for the capital defendant.
331 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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ther problems that are especially detrimental to capital defendants
because the new approach does away with the "ends ofjustice" test
for relitigated claims. This may not be such a high price to pay for
noncapital defendants since it is arguable that unless the initial proceeding was somehow lacking, the questions ofjustice should have
been resolved in the first petition. However, for capital defendants
the "ends of justice" exception, allowing for reconsideration of a
claim, acts as a safeguard against mistake in the imposition of a
33 2
death sentence.
The Court's application of summary dismissals to capital cases
is particularly shocking in the area of "new law" and "new fact"
claims. This is evidenced when viewing the Court's treatment of the
Stephens v. Kemp case.3 3 3 Stephens, in his second petition for federal

habeas relief, contended that a new study demonstrating the "arbitrary and unequal imposition of capital punishment based upon the
race of the defendant and the race of the victim," 33 4 constituted

"newly discovered evidence" as articulated in Townsend.3 3 5 At the
time Stephens filed his second petition, the Eleventh Circuit was
considering in several other cases the identical evidence that Stephens presented in his petition. Nevertheless, the district court
summarily dismissed Stephens' petition as an "abuse of the writ,"
holding that although the new studies constituted "newly discovered evidence" for purposes of permitting relief on a first petition
for habeas review, the identical studies did not constitute "newly
discovered evidence" for purposes of securing relief on a second
petition.3 3 6 The Supreme Court denied certiorari and vacated the
stay of execution "notwithstanding the continued pendency of the
33 7
discrimination issue before the Eleventh Circuit."
It has been settled that "newly discovered evidence" is "evidence which could not reasonably have been presented by the petitioner in the earlier proceeding." 3' 3 8 Therefore, the lower court's
rejection of Stephens' statistical evidence, premised on the ground
that "[n]othing prevented the compilation of this information prior
332 See Morris, supra note 38, at 384.
333 Stephens v. Kemp, 469 U.S. 1043 (1984).
334

Stephens v. Kemp, 578 F. Supp. 103 (M.D. Ga. 1983).

335 372 U.S. 391 (1980).
336 Stephens, 578 F. Supp. at 108.
337 Stephens, 469 U.S. at 1044 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see McCleskey v. Zant, 580

F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984), where it was held that statistics on Georgia death penalty
statute did not demonstrate prima facie case in support of contention that death penalty
was imposed upon petitioner because of his race or because of the race of the victim.
338 Stephens, 469 U.S. at 1051 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 317 (1963)); see also id. at n.10 (Townsend test for "newly discovered evidence"
is the same whether first or second petition).
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to this late date,"33 9 renders Congress's instruction, that newly discovered evidence be given fair consideration, meaningless. As Justice Brennan notes "'newly discovered evidence' by definition
always existed at an earlier time; the inquiry, rather, is whether the
petitioner reasonably either did not know about it or could not have
presented it at an earlier proceeding. ' 34 0 Since in the instant case it
is clearly apparent that the statistical studies were unavailable at the
time Stephens filed his first habeas petition, 34 1 we are left with an
irrational situation. The possibility of preventing an execution due
to "newly discovered evidence" should not depend on whether the
defendant has filed a first habeas petition at the time this new evi3 42
dence became available.
This case raises a further question as to the propriety of the
Court's treatment of successive petitions claimed to be an "abuse of
' 34 3
the writ," "particularly where a human life hangs in the balance."
It has long since been established under Sanders that if a petitioner,
in response to a State's allegation of abuse of the writ, pleads facts
that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, he must receive an
evidentiary hearing. 44 The district court held that Stephens did in
fact receive this evidentiary hearing at which time he failed to adequately "proffer" the new studies.3 45 However, the purpose of this
alleged "evidentiary hearing" was to "clarify whether (1) Stephens'
execution should be stayed and (2) whether and to what extent an
evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the underlying merits
of Stephens' petition." 34 6 Moreover, counsel insisted that Judge
Owen's law clerk informed them that they were not expected to
bring witnesses to the oral argument.3 47 Finally, it is worthy of note
that five of the dissenters had no problem reaching the conclusion
that "the hearing held by the district court on November 15, 1983
was not an evidentiary hearing. '3 48 Until this decision, it seemed to
be a long-standing principle that "[d]ue process of law.., does not
allow a hearing to be held ... without giving [petitioners] timely
notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they
Stephens, 578 F. Supp.'at 107.
Stephens, 469 U.S. at 1051.
341 Id.
342 See Morris, supra note 38, at 385.
343 Stephens, 469 U.S. at 1054 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
344 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1962).
345 Stepenas, 469 U.S. at 1044 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
346 Id.
347 Id. at 1045-46.
348 Stephens v. Kemp, 722 F.2d 627, 628 n.3 (M.D. Ga. 1983).
339
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must meet. '3 49 In fact, even though it has been established that ex3 50
pedited briefings and hearings are permissible in capital cases,
they are permissible only under the condition that counsel has "adequate opportunity to address the merits and knows that he is expected to do so." 3 5 1 This principle seems to apply with greater
force in a case like the one at hand, where there exists "uncontradicted record evidence that counsel in fact were affirmatively advised not to bring their witnesses to the argument" and where
petitioner "unknowingly had and lost his only chance to avoid
352
execution."
Moreover, the impact of the Kuhlmann decision as well as the
criticisms resulting therefrom take on enhanced significance when
viewing the lower federal courts' application of this decision in
death penalty cases. In Jones v. Henderson,3 5 3 the court concluded
that since a common ground existed between the plurality and the
Steven's dissent, courts may consider whether there are "colorable
claims of innocence" when presented with successive habeas petitions. The court then instructed the district court that on remand,
in determining whether to review the petition on the merits, "it is
free to consider whether the petitioner has supplemented his claim
with a colorable showing of innocence just as it may consider
whether an intervening change in the law has taken place."3

54

This

position was criticized by the dissent as being an unreasonable application of the Sanders "ends ofjustice" test:
Since less than a majority of the Court has taken the position that the
Sanders test is so modified, I would not suggest to the district court,
especially in a case involving a constitutional right having value reaching beyond the trial court's truth-seeking function, that it need not

entertain a repetitive writ that is based on intervening developments in
the law regarding that right
simply because no colorable showing of
3 55
innocence has been made.

Moreover, in Messer v. Kemp, 3 56 a case that involved the filing of
a successive petition on the grounds that the Ake 3 57 decision consti-

tuted an intervening change in the law, the court, while acknowledging that Kuhlmann has not substantially changed the Sanders "ends of
349 469 U.S. at 1055 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34

(1967).
350

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 894 (1983).

351
352

Id.

353

809 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1987).

354

Id. at 952.
Id. at 954 (Kearse, J., concurring).

355
356
357

469 U.S. at 1056.

647 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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justice" test, goes on to conclude that since Kuhlmann indicates the
importance of the "colorable showing of factual innocence" factor,
it would be inappropriate to give the change in intervening law
alone controlling weight and is therefore insufficient to require consideration.3 5 8 The significance of this stance becomes apparent due
to the fact that before the Kuhlmann decision, an intervening change
in law "seemed to guarantee reconsideration in the Eleventh Circuit."3 59 This, coupled with the fact that the court acknowledged
that a man's life being at stake is a "weighty factor" that "the Court
ftilly appreciates"3 60 "in the ends ofjustice determination, indicates
that the impact of the Kuhlmann decision is not as trivial as previ36
ously implied. '
Moreover, although every defendant, whether capital or not,
should be guaranteed an opportunity to present new evidence that
casts a doubt on the reliability of the conviction, this right becomes
particularly crucial to capital defendants.3 6 2 Because capital sentencing procedures have the potential to lead to unwarranted deathsentences, there exists a "far more subtle type of 'new' evidence [in
these cases]: evidence which should have been introduced in mitigation during the sentencing phase of a capital trial."363 "Because
many of the attorneys who handle capital cases are inexperienced in
death penalty proceedings . . ."364 and also because capital cases
require additional "insight and effort beyond that required in most
non-capital cases," 3 65 it is not a rare occurrence that lawyers fail to
introduce evidence which should have been asserted to dissuade the
jury from imposing death. 3 66 Thus, the risk posed by summarily dismissing successive petitions involving "new facts" becomes especially egregious in capital cases since, given the severity of the
sentence, it is particularly arguable that these defendants not be penalized for lack of due diligence on the part of trial counsel in fully
investigating the case.
Much of the criticisms resulting from the Court's decision in
Smith 3 67 lie within these parameters. In Smith, the Court extended
1043.
359 Id. at 1043 n.9.
358 Id. at

360 Id. at 1043.
361 See supra notes

355-60 and accompanying text. But see Moore v. Kemp, 824 F.2d
847 (11th Cir. 1987).
362 See Morris, supra note 38, at 385.
363 Id.
364
365
366
367

Id. at 386.
Id. at 386 n.74; see also supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
See Morris, supra note 38, at 386.
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
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its decision in Carrier3 68 to hold that the petitioner forfeited his constitutional claim as to admission of psychiatric testimony, at the sentencing phase of a capital proceeding, by failing to raise it on direct
appeal.3 69 The Court, by stating that "we reject the suggestion that
principles of Wainwright v. Sykes apply differently depending on the
nature of the penalty a state imposes for the violation of its criminal
laws," 3 7 0 indicates its refusal to allow the defendant's interests in
vindicating constitutional rights to prevail over state concerns of
comity, federalism, and finality, even in a capital case. In light of the
fact that the Court recently reiterated "that execution is the most
irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different,"3' 7 Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Carrier:

Even if I did not believe that this difference in the State's interests was
sufficient to require holding that counsel's inadvertence constitutes
cause, there is an additional difference in the defendant's interests that
compels this conclusion in Smith v. Murray: the fact that it is a capital

case. To the extent that... the definition of cause requires consideration of the interests of the defendant as well as of the State, it strikes
me as cruelly unfair to bind a defendant to his lawyer's inadvertent
failure to prevent prejudicial constitutional error thus barring access
to federal review-where the consequence to the defendant is
death.372

Justice Brennan further suggests that "against this background of
special concern, 'comity' and 'federalism' concerns simply do not
require such an exercise of this Court's discretion in capital
cases."

3 73

A further concern emanating from Smith 374 involves the fact
that the Court allowed a constitutional violation, one recognized as
of great importance in a capital sentencing proceeding,3 7 5 to go
unexamined when a life is at stake due to a procedural bar. The
implication of the Court's holding, that only a claim involving "ac3 76 is
tual innocence" rises to the level of a miscarriage of justice,
368 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
369 Smith, 477 U.S. at 539.
370 Id. at 538.

371 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).
372

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 525-26 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

373 Id.

477 U.S. at 527.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981), makes it clear that the introduction by the prosecution, at the sentencing phase,
of petitioner's comments to the court-appointed psychiatrist violated the fifth amendment. The Court stated that fifth amendment rights apply to capital sentencing proceedings: "Just as the fifth amendment prevents a criminal defendant from being made
the deluded instrument of his own conviction; it protects him as well." Id. at 461.
376 Smith, 477 U.S. at 542-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
374
375
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unreasonable at best. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent
in Smith, this position is apposite to the Court's previous understanding of habeas corpus. 377 The Court itself has specifically rejected the view that the presence of a serious constitutional violation
was actually an inquiry into the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
In Moore v. Dempsey, 378 the Court stated that "what we have to deal
with is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question
whether their constitutional rights have been preserved." 3 79 Along
these lines, Justice Brennan more recently stated, "The constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and
'38 0
guilty alike."
Thus, Justice Stevens noted that if accuracy in guilt or innocence were the only value of our criminal justice system, then many
of our constitutional protections, such as the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination and the eighth amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment, would become irrelevant.3 8 ' Justice
Stevens continued by recognizing the significance of our constitutional framework and our decision to adopt an accusatorial system
of justice:
Our Constitution, however, and our decision to adopt an "accusatorial," rather than an "inquisitorial" system ofjustice, reflect a different
choice. That choice is to afford the individual certain protections-the
right against compelled self-incrimination and the right against cruel
and unusual punishment among them-even if those rights do not
necessarily implicate the accuracy of the truth-finding proceedings.
Rather, those protections are an aspect of the fundamental fairness,
liberty and individual dignity that our society affords to all, even those
charged with heinous crimes.... Our criminal justice system, and our
Constitution, protect other values in addition to the reliability of the
guilt or innocence determination and the statutory
duty to serve "law
38 2
and justice" should simply reflect those values.
The Court's failure to adhere to this choice may unfortunately
render Justice Brennan's fear, that "we have lost our sense of the
transcendent importance of the Bill of Rights to our society, 3 8s3 a
truth.
The injustice of the Court's extension of Carrierto capital cases
377
378
379
380

Id. at 543.
261 U.S. 86 (1923).
Id. at 87-88.

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986); see also Walberg v. Israel, 766
F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.). But see Kuhlmann v. Wilson 477 U.S.
436, 452-54 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
381 Smith, 477 U.S. at 544 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
382 Id. at 544-45.
383 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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is further evidenced when considering that many of the policy concerns underlying the Sykes and Carrierdecisions are irrelevant in the
context of death penalty cases. For example, the Court in Sykes espoused the notion that liberal excusal of procedural forfeitures detracts from the prominence of the trial as the "main event. 3 8s 4
Moreover, the Court recognized that procedural forfeitures promote the state's ability quickly to resolve any constitutional issues
that may arise.3 85 However sound these concerns, they conflict with
the realities of death penalty trial proceedings. Regardless of
whether it is a capital or noncapital case, it proves highly unreasonable to expect counsel to raise all possible constitutional issues at the
trial stage. 8 6 In fact, requiring counsel to raise all conceivable but
undeveloped issues "might actually disrupt state court proceedings
by encouraging defense counsel to include any and all remotely
plausible constitutional claims that could, someday, gain
recognition.-

38 7

This requirement would be particularly unrealistic in death
penalty cases because the range of issues with which counsel must
deal and have knowledge substantially increases from those involved in noncapital cases. 38 8 In addition, unlike for a noncapital
defendant, "the focus and attention of the state is never removed
from the capital inmate [and] the state is on notice to retain evidence and preserve important testimony in preparation for the inevitable capital appeals." 3 8 9 Thus, the Court's assertion that the trial
is the "main event" breaks down when applied to death penalty law
because it fails to take into account the complexity and character of
390
the issues involved.
Another policy consideration underlying Sykes as well as many
of the Court's other.habeas corpus opinions involves another aspect
of the notion of finality, that is, the concern for the convict's need
"to get on with the process of rehabilitation." As Justice Harlan
once observed:
Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in
insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with
an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not
384 See supra note 89.
385 See supra note 13.
386 See Catz, supra note 17,
387 Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S.
388 See Catz, supra note 17,

at 1212.
1, 15-16 (1984).
at 1212 ("[T]he attorney in these cases also must be concerned with developing evidence of mitigating circumstances, the heightened public attention given to the trial, [and] jury qualification under Witherspoon.").
389 See Morris, supra note 38.
390 Catz, supra note 17, at 1212.
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on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether
the
1
prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.3 9
This concern is of extreme importance to the defendant who faces a
death sentence because the only finality of interest involved is the
finality of death.3 9 2 As Justice O'Connor stated, the question of
whether the prisoner is in fact capable of rehabilitation is answerable only after a "careful and comprehensive review of society's decision to kill one of its members. 3 9g3 In this light then, denying
habeas review prematurely for capital defendants is counterproductive to the concept of rehabilitation.3 94
Another criticism of the Court's application of the Sykes cause
and prejudice test in Smith involves the Court's concern with the
guilt-innocence determination rather than with constitutional errors
not reflecting on that inquiry. The problem arises because the
Court seems to interject its "colorable showing of factual innocence" test, apparently created to focus on the need for this guiltinnocence determination, where it does not logically apply. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Kuhlmann:
[I]t is unclear what relevance the plurality's standard would have in a
case in which a prisoner alleges constitutional error in the sentencing
phase of a capital case. Guilt or innocence is irrelevant in that context;
rather there is only a decision made by representatives of the community whether the prisoner shall live or die. 39 5
Along these lines, I submit that while attorney error may be justifiable in denying a petitioner federal court review in an ordinary case,
it should at least entitle the habeas petitioner in a capital case to
such review.
VII.

THE ADOPTION OF PROCEDURES AFFORDING A LESSER CHANCE
FOR FEDERAL REVIEW ON THE MERITS OF A CAPITAL CASE

Is NOT WARRANTED
The Supreme Court, in formulating obstacles to habeas review,
has lost sight of the fact that
between 1976, when the Supreme Court restored the death penalty in
Gregg v. Georgia, and 1983, the federal courts of appeals-when they
reached the merits of the petition on habeas review-had decided
more than 73%o of the capital cases in favor of the death-sentenced
prisoner. This number stands out starkly against the rate of success
391 Id. (quoting from Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J.,

dissenting)).
392
393
394
395

Id. at 1212-13.
Id. at 1213.
Id.
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 471-72 n.7 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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for appeals in non-capital habeas cases-typically less than 7%. 396
This high reversal rate in habeas death cases strongly supports the
view that the Court's adoption of limitations, restricting such review
for condemned persons, is unwarranted.3 9 7 The Court should endeavor to conclude that numerous errors in capital cases are likely
to occur in the future as well. 39 8 "This becomes evident when viewing the various grounds that Courts have found in the past for requiring these reversals." 39 9 For example, "[t]here have been at
least six recent cases where defendants sentenced to death were
[subsequently found innocent]. '40 0 Others were either retried and
convicted of noncapital offenses after having their convictions reversed or were resentenced to less than a life sentence after having
their sentences vacated. 401 An even larger number of cases have
held that the capital defendant was convicted in violation of the Federal Constitution. 40 2 The Supreme Court itself has continued to re4 03
verse capital sentences for various reasons.
Perhaps the severe impact of the Court's recent attempts to
foreclose habeas review for capital defendants is best illustrated by
the events leading up to the release of the defendants in the Pitts
case. In this case, the defendants' convictions were set aside on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence. 40 4 A new trial was commenced and the defendants were convicted a second time. 40 5 Curtis
Adams later confessed to murders for which the defendants had
been sentenced, and the defendants were pardoned. This situation,
where a defendant is released after another person's confession to
the crime was corroborated, is not as rare an occurrence as one may
think.40 6 Although in these cases the defendants' lives were spared,
they bring to surface one of the most disturbing aspects of the
Supreme Court's present willingness to abandon full review of
396 See Robbins, Wither (or Wither) Habeas Corpus?: Observations on the Supreme Court's
1985 Term, 111 F.R.D. 265, 285 (1986) (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at app. E lb-lb, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880

(1983)).
397 See Greenberg, supra note 315, at 919.
398 Id.
399 Id.

400 Id. at 920.
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 Id. at 921 ("The Supreme Court has [reversed] capital sentences based upon

Witherspoon, the vagueness of the sentencing statute, ex parte consultation of probation
reports to the judge, double jeopardy, and admission of impermissible psychiatric
testimony.")
404 See Pitts v. State, 166 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1964).
405 See Pitts v. State, 307 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
406 See Greenberg, supra note 315, at 920 & n.68.
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death penalty cases: the exacerbated risk that will inevitably result
in the taking of innocent lives due to uncorrected errors. Does such
an approach have any place in a civilized and sensibly administered
system of justice?
Before one can answer such a question, perhaps it is necessary
to determine why the Court might adopt procedures that dispense
with this particular need for reliability in capital cases. Justice Marshall's suggestion in Barefoot 40 7 provides some guidance by pointing
out that "the only hint of a possible rationale," for adopting special
summary procedures solely for capital cases is the Court's quotation
of a statement in Lambert v. Barrett.40 8 The quotation suggests that
the Court's approval of summary procedures rests on an assumption
that appeals by prisoners under sentence of death are generally frivolous. 40 9 However, it is apparent from the historical evidence that
this assumption is totally without merit.410 Furthermore, even if
frivolous claims did present a recurring problem in capital habeas
cases, it can easily be managed. The requirement of obtaining a certificate of probable cause before appeal was inserted in the Federal
Rules to thwart such claims. 4 1 ' Perhaps the strongest repudiation of
the Court's willingness to tolerate such limitations on habeas review
in death penalty cases was written by Justice Blackmun in his dissent
in Darden v. Wainwright:
Although the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant only a fair
trial and not a perfect one.., this Court has stressed repeatedly in the
decade since Gregg... that the Eighth Amendment requires a heightened degree of reliability in any case where a state seeks to take the
defendants' life. Today's opinion, however, reveals a Court willing to
tolerate not only imperfection but a level of fairness and
reliability so
4 12
low it should make conscientious prosecutors cringe.
This statement could have as easily been written in response to
other Supreme Court decisions previously mentioned in this note,
specifically those that have created procedural formulations allowing for habeas review to be severely limited for capital
4 13
defendants.
However, it is the Court itself that provides the ammunition
needed to make the job of establishing the illegitimacy of the
Court's new procedures one of relative ease. The Court recently
407
408
409
410
411
412
413

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 914 (1983).
Id. at 914 (citing Lambert v. Barrett, 159 U.S. 660, 662 (1895)).
Id. at 914-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 396-99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 177.
477 U.S. 168, 188-9 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 181-4.
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advanced in Ford v. Wainwright 4 14 the notion that "the minimum assurance that the life and death guess will be a truly informed guess
requires respect for the basic ingredient of due process, namely an
opportunity to be allowed to substantiate a claim before it is rejected.' "415 The Court further announced that "the lodestar of any
effort to devise a procedure must be the overriding dual imperative
of providing redress for those with substantial claims ....

The

Court, by setting forth these pronouncements, intimates precisely
the problem with its new procedures. By both applying lenient standards, whether to determine either effective assistance of counsel or
when to exclude a juror for bias, and allowing for summarily dismissing successive petitions, summary proceedings, and denial of
review due to procedural defaults, the Court sanctions the very result feared: the inability to provide redress for those with substantial claims. This becomes evident because, as in the case of
procedural defaults, the merits of the petitioner's claim will never
have been reached. 41 7 Furthermore, even assuming that these new
procedures are in response to a justifiable concern with increasing
frivolous capital appeals and that the merits are at least considered,
the procedures still fail because they provide no meaningful way to
ferret out those claims which are worthy of review from those that
are not.4 18 Admittedly then, these new procedures can only be
viewed as illegitimate actions of the Court.
In this light, then, the principle that "death is different" -carries
just as much weight today as it had in the days following Furman
because nothing has intervened to detract from the purposes that
underlie the doctrine that called it into existence.
VIII.

AN ARGUMENT FOR A RETURN TO THE PRINCIPLES OF FURMAN

The Supreme Court, in numerous and various holdings, has reaffirmed the principles underlying Furman and its progeny. Today
the Court strays from that principle. Even more troubling, however,
the Court strikes down that tenet while offering little empirical basis
for why it purports to do so. There is no justification for such action; therefore the Court should return to the previously well-established principles of Furman. Furthermore, because this "heightened
standard" can only be achieved by allowing effective access to fed414

477 U.S. 399 (1986).

415 Id. at 414 (quoting Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 23 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.
dissenting).
416 Id. at 417.

417 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
418 See Boaz, supra note 189, at 358.
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eral habeas review, the Court should cease to deprive capital litigants of such review.
It appears that these recent limitations on review stem from a
desire to curtail the long lags between imposing the death sentence
and actual execution. 419 Apparently, the Court feels that the only
way to do this is to prevent federal courts from reaching the merits
of the constitutional challenges of these condemned persons. This
is evidenced by ChiefJustice Burger's dissent from the Court's grant
of certiorari in Darden.
In the 12 years since petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, the issues now raised in the petition for certiorari
have been considered by this Court four times .

.

. and have been

passed upon no fewer than 95 times by federal and state court judges.
Upon review of the petition and history of this case, I conclude that no
issues are presented that merit plenary review by this Court. Because
we abuse our discretion when we accept meritless 4petitions
presenting
claims that we rejected only hours ago, I dissent. 20
As Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Dardem, explains, this statement
"suggests that he [ChiefJustice Burger] irrevocably had committed
himself to rejecting those claims before he had received the benefit
of the full briefing, oral argument, access to the record and discussion of the issues by other Members of the Court, that followed the
grant of certiorari." 4 2 1 Justice Blackmun further observed that "the
fact that this Court has granted certiorari three times is hardly a reason for concluding Darden's claims are meritless, or that the undoubted interest in finality should outweigh our duty to ensure that
Darden receive due process. ' 42 2 ChiefJustice Burger's willingness
to allow the right of an individual to considered treatment of his
claims to succumb to concerns such as finality, comity, and efficiency
clearly undermines the Court's longstanding commitment to vindi419 See supra notes 309-11 and accompanying text; see also Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S.
1237, 1240 (1983) ("This case illustrates a recent pattern of calculated efforts to frus-

trate valid judgments after painstaking judicial review over a number of years; at some
point there must be finality.") (Burger, CJ., concurring in denial of certiorari and denial
of application for stay); Brooks v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1061, 1067 (1982) (Court rejected
Brook's contention that Fifth Circuit had not fully considered the merits of his appeal,
agreeing with the court of appeals' refusal to reconsider claims "so often considered and
of such little merit.").
420 Darden v. Wainwright, 473 U.S. 928, 929 (1985) (Burger, CJ., dissenting from the
grant of certiorari).
421 477 U.S. 168, 205 n.9 (1986) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
422 Id. This statement is further supported by cases such as House v. Balkcom, 725
F.2d 608 (1 1th Cir. 1984), where Jack House's conviction was finally reversed after
spending 11 years on death row pursuing his appeals. See also Hobbs v. Pepersack, 206
F. Supp. 301 (D. Md. 1962) (granting relief of eight federal habeas petitions). Admit-

tedly, the issues involved in these cases have been litigated before numerous courts, yet
the claims presented were eventually found to have merit.

482

DIANE WELLS

[Vol. 80

cate the constitutional rights of capital defendants. This commitment, which provides for heightened constitutional standards for
condemned prisoners, is further undermined by the Court's new
trend in death penalty law. 4 23 The Court has now begun to lower

these standards in an effort to make execution possible, just when
the higher standards were beginning to yield results. 4 24 In this
light, the legitimacy of this new approach becomes particularly
questionable.
The unfairness of the Court's efforts to restrict federal postconviction review is further explicated by the unlikelihood that there
will be a notable reduction in the number of errors found in capital
convictions or sentences. 4 25 In the past, states have flagrantly disregarded clear legal standards. 42 6 Other states' death penalty sen427
tencing procedures have resulted in interpretational errors.
Furthermore, it is apparent from the extraordinary range of errors
found in capital cases in the past 4 28 that many errors will likely occur
42 9
in the future.
In light of the frequent occurrence of errors requiring later reversals of capital convictions and sentences, Justice Powell's presumption that the job that federal courts perform on habeas review
43 0
has adequately been done by state courts is hardly fathomable.
423 See State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).
424 See Boaz, supra note 189, at 352. Approximately 907o of all executions since the
end, in 1977, of the decade-long moratorium on capital punishments have occurred
since Barefoot was decided. Many of these executions resulted from the Supreme Court's
denying a stay of execution. Id.
425 See Greenberg, supra note 315, at 923.
426 See Greenberg, supra note 315, at 923 (Texas courts applied statute for 12 years
which was in obvious violation of Witherspoon).
427 See Songer v. Wainwright, 769 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); Lucas v. State, 490 So.
2d 943 (Fla. 1986); Harvard v. State, 486 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1986), where all three death
sentences were overturned because judges conducting sentencing proceedings believed
that Florida law precluded consideration of non-statutory mitigating circumstances.

The Florida legislature has since removed the phrase "as enumerated in the statutory
list" from the provisions requiring the advisory jury and the sentencing judge to consider mitigating circumstances. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2)(b), (3)(b) (1987).
428 See supra notes 400-403.
429 See Greenberg, supra note 315, at 923; see also Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th
Cir. 1985) (held that death qualified juries to determine a criminal defendant's guilt
constituted a per se violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments); Ritter v. Smith,
726 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1984) (state death penalty statute's sentencing procedures
were facially unconstitutional); Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643 (11 th Cir. 1983) (reversed
sentence because trial court failed to explain what function consideration of circumstances in extenuation or mitigation would play in sentencing deliberations); House v.
Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608 (11 th Cir. 1984) (reversed conviction of Jack House because
evidence revealed that victims were alive two hours after the state claimed House killed
them).
430 See supra note 305.
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Justice Powell attempts to justify imposing limitations on habeas re43
view in his concurrence in Ford: '
Modem practice provides far more extensive review of convictions and
sentences than did the common law, including not only direct appeal
but ordinarily both state and federal collateral review.... It is thus
unlikely indeed that a defendant today could go to his death
with
43 2
knowledge of undiscovered trial error that might set him free.
However, if Justice Powell is suggesting that this assumption justifies limiting access to habeas review, his reasoning is severely
flawed. The very evidence Justice Powell sets forth to conclude that
errors in conviction are not likely to result in unwarranted executions due to more extensive review433 strongly argues against imposing limitations that would allow for such executions. If the
petitioner in Ford was denied full access to his post-conviction remedies due to procedural obstacles, the execution of an insane person
may well have resulted. A majority of the Court has recognized that
such an execution offends humanity and undermines the dignity of
4 34
society.
Moreover, while it may be conceded that the Constitution does
not require a perfect trial for a capital defendant, 43 5 clearly a system
that places the utmost value on individual life must afford him the
best procedural protections that can be provided. This standard of
protection is obviously not being met when the Court allows imposition of potentially unjust death sentences due to procedural formulations. 4 36 Possibly no better illustration than the dissent in the case
of John Eldon Smith exists to remind us that procedural bars to
habeas review have no place in death penalty jurisprudence.
Machetti, the mastermind in this murder, has had her conviction overFord v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Id. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring).
433 Justice Powell presents the history of petitioner Ford's attempts to obtain relief
from his conviction or execution in the various courts. Id. at 420 n. I.
431

432

434

Id. at 408-10.

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 188 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)).
436 In one recent Florida case, the son of the man condemned to death for the killing
of his daughter recanted testimony he gave at his father's trial years before that provided
the sole evidence for the finding of premeditation. The father raised this newly discovered evidence in his habeas petition, but his case was rushed through the lower federal
courts in less than three days, with a circuit judge pleading that "there has not been
enough time in which justiciably to decide this case." Dobbert v. Wainwright, 742 F.2d
1231, 1274 (11 th Cir. 1984) (Clark, J., dissenting). Speeding to the Supreme Court,
Dobbert asked the Court to pause just long enough to allow him to brief his appeal.
Less than a day later, he was executed. No court had actually addressed the issue of
whether the recantation testimony was credible .evidence. Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468
U.S. 1231 (1984). See Boaz, supra note 189, at 365 n.86.
435
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turned, has had a new trial, and has received a life sentence. This
Court overturned her first conviction because in the county where her
trial was held, women were unconstitutionally underrepresented in the
jury pool. Her lawyers timely raised this constitutional objection.
They won; she lives.
John Eldon Smith was tried in the same county, by a jury drawn from
the same unconstitutionally composed jury pool, but because his lawyers did not timely raise the unconstitutionality of the jury pool he
faces electrocution. His lawyers waived the jury issue. Judicial economy, as required by recent decisions of the Supreme Court, dictate
that we not reach the underrepresentati
on of women issue even under
43 7
principles of "manifest injustice.'
The recent procedures by which the Supreme Court allows a condemned person to be executed inevitably result in "arbitrariness
and capriciousness," the very concerns which gave rise to the doctrine of Furman. The Supreme Court could not rightly hold that it is
any less abhorrent today to allow "similar cases" to be treated differently than it was in the pre-Furman days.
Moreover, if the concern certain members of the Court have
with not carrying out death sentences imposed by the state 43 8 were
to be allayed, it would inevitably require the execution rate to rise
significantly because it would be necessary to execute 200 death row
prisoners per year just to offset the new arrivals. 43 9 If the further
goal of reducing the death row population were to be achieved,
even more executions would be necessary. 4 40 This, coupled with
the fact that public support for capital punishment decreases in periods in which the U.S. carries out executions, 4 4 ' suggests that these

increased numbers of executions would only serve to diminish pub437 Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003
(1983) (Hatchett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
438 See supra note 419; see also Sherill, Death Row on Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983,
§ 6, at 80 (Justice Powell observed that such delays [from habeas corpus petitions] "undermine public confidence in our system ofjustice").
In Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1979), Justice Rehnquist asserted:
[J]ust as the rule of law entitled a criminal defendant to be surrounded with all the
protections which do surround him under our system prior to conviction and during trial and appellate review, the other side of that coin is that when the State has
taken all the steps required by that rule of law, its will, as represented by the legislature which authorized the imposition of the death sentence, and the state courts
which imposed and upheld it, should be carried out.
Members of the Court have also expressed the concern that if death sentences are not
carried out promptly the deterrent effect of the punishment will be lessened. "When
society promises to punish by death certain criminal conduct and then the courts fail to
do so, the courts not only lessen the deterrent effect of the threat of capital punishment,
they undermine the integrity of the entire criminal justice system." Coleman v.
Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
439 See Greenberg, supra note 315, at 924.
440 Id.
441 Id.
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lic acceptance for further implementation of the death penalty. 44 2

As a result, the Court should endeavor to conclude that it would
"undermine public confidence in our system" by imposing restrictions on habeas review when a life is at stake more than it would to
allow for the delays attending adjudication of federal habeas corpus
petitions.
Some federal courts have attempted to bring a measure of order to the procedural limitations created by the Court to reduce delays in executions. These lower courts appear to have taken the
view that a state's right to a speedy execution should not be allowed
to prevail at the expense of denying an individual his right to fair
review of his federal constitutional challenges. Evidently, these
courts are prepared to live up to their obligations to safeguard the
liberties of capital defendants even if the Supreme Court is not.
This is indicated by the many actions taken by lower federal courts,
to circumvent the harsh results rendered by the Supreme Court's
new policies toward capital habeas review. For example, many
courts have held that a procedural default will not automatically
serve to bar federal habeas review if the state fails to preserve this
issue on appeal or if the state court decides to raise and answer a
constitutional question. 443 A federal court may also reach the merits of a habeas claim if the state has not clearly announced or strictly
adhered to the procedural bar.4 44 Other courts have refrained from
allowing state imposed execution dates to interfere with ordinary
appellate procedures, even in light of the summary review proce44 5
dures sanctioned in Barefoot.
442 Id.
443 See Catz, supra note 390, at 1206-07; see also Cooper v. Wainwright, 807 F.2d 881,

887 (11th Cir. 1986) ("if state chooses to ignore a defendant's failure to abide by a
contemporaneous objection rule, the federal courts may reach the merits of the substantive claim"). In Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 891 (11th Cir. 1987), the court stated,
"Magill should not be allowed to elevate a simple evidentiary complaint into a claim that
evidence relevant to non-statutory mitigating circumstances was restricted-to catapult
the claim beyond the barriers of procedural default.". The federal court rejected this
contention: "While the brief does not cite to federal cases in support of its claim, it 'at
least provided the Court with some of the elements of a constitutional argument.'" Id.
at 891 (citing Cooper v. Wainwright, 807 F.2d 881, 887 (11 th Cir. 1986)). As a result of
finding no procedural default, the Court's review was not precluded by the procedural
default rule of Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986). Id. at 892.
444 See, e.g., Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1986) (because the Missis-

sippi Supreme Court had not dearly announced, or strictly or regularly followed, the
procedural bar at the time of Wheat's direct appeal, there is no prevention of federal
review); see also Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458, 1470 (11th Cir. 1986) (novel or sporadically applied procedural bar not adequate and independent state ground precluding
federal habeas review); Mann v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1471, 1483 (11 th Cir. 1987) (arbitrary
and unannounced procedural bar cannot preclude federal habeas review).
445 See Blair v. Armontrout, 604 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (W.D. Mo. 1985), in which the
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Still other courts are construing these new procedural formulations very narrowly, thereby abstaining from rigidly applying
them.4 4 6 Moreover, many federal courts have resisted the departure
from the principle that "death is different." The courts seem to be
giving special effect to death penalty cases by affording the capital
petitioner every chance to review, even where it would not be afforded to the noncapital petitioner. 4 47 Federal courts are also criticourt held that "there is no valid reason justifying the Missouri Supreme Court's failure
to grant a stay of execution. To the limited extent that the granting of a stay may depend on the probability of success on the merits," see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983) (petitioner advised the Missouri Supreme Court that federal habeas review was
being sought, pursuant to a recent decision of the Court, yet the petitioner's request was
denied by the same Court). The court further indicated that the right of review is rendered utterly meaningless if the execution is set on a date within the time specified for
review. Blair, 604 F. Supp. at 725. See also Chaney v. Brown, 712 F.2d 441 (10th Cir.
1983), where the Court relies on Barefoot and other Supreme Court decisions citing Barefoot to stay an execution:
In view of the issuance of the certificate of probable cause for an appeal; the substantial lengthy opinion of the District Court discussing seven issues raised by the
federal habeas suit; this court's obligation to give the parties the opportunity to fully
address the underlying merits; this Court's duty to give due consideration to the
merits of the appeal; the obvious restrictions of time in the circumstances of this
case and the irreversible nature of the death penalty, we are constrained to grant [a
stay] ......
Id. at 443; see also Bundy v. Wainwright, 808 F.2d 1410, 1421 (11 th Cir. 1987) (reversed
denial of stay of execution, where the Court, through dicta, suggests that although
Bundy may not be entitled to succeed on the merits of any of his claims, the petition
demonstrates a likelihood of success in at least some respects sufficient to justify a stay).
446 Bundy, 808 F. 2d at 1421. In deciding whether it would grant a stay, the district
court wrongly applied Barefoot. The federal court of appeals held that "Barefoot addressed the handling of requests for stays in death sentence habeas corpus cases in the
courts of appeal and in the Supreme Court of the United States.... Nothing in Barefoot
suggests that the Supreme Court intended to, if indeed it could, after the pleading obligations set out for habeas cases in the Federal District Courts by § 2254 Rules." Id. at
1420-21.
See also Richmond v. Rickett, 774 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1985), where the court overturned a holding that Richmond's second petition constituted "abuse of writ." The relief obtained by Richmond on his first petition went only to the sentence. However,
Richmond was resentenced to death pursuant to a new statute that cured the deficiency
at issue in his first habeas petition. The court held that it was not an abuse of writ to
seek appeal for the adverse determinations of his other grounds challenging the death
sentence in his first petition that he may have been unable to raise due to mootness
grounds. If he were to prevail on appeal of these claims, he could not be resentenced.
See also Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478 (1 th Cir. 1986), where the court reiterated that "previous decisions of this and our predecessor Circuit acknowledged that the
abuse of writ doctrine is of rare and extraordinary application; a doctrine that should not
be rigidly applied."
447 See Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1985), where the court reversed defendant's judgment of conviction due to prosecution's failure to disclose police report,
in which one of the eyewitnesses initially indicated that he did not see the killer's face
and could not identify him. The court stated:
Whether it is reasonably probable that a different result might have been obtained
had the evidence been disclosed is a question of agonizing closeness. This is a
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cally evaluating and reversing, if not the conviction, the sentence. 4 4 s
It seems feasible to conclude that these federal courts are using sentence reversals as a last resort to atone for the injustices they are
bound to inflict on capital defendants due to recent Supreme Court
decisions.
capital case, however, and one moreover in which our reading of the evidence
shows there is a possibility that the wrong man is to be executed. In such a case, if
ever, petitioner should receive the benefit of the doubt.
l at 1043.
See also Songer v. Wainwright, 605 F. Supp. 686, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1985), where the
court issued a certificate of probable cause stating that although the court found no basis
to apply an intervening law to the present case, it may be debatable among jurists.
"Since this is a capital case, petitioner shouldn't be foreclosed from urging such contention on appeal." Id.
See also Wilson v. Butler, 825 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1987), where the court reversed its
decision to remand the case for a hearing only on Wilson's claim that counsel was ineffective at the sentencing phase of the trial, while dismissing Wilson's claim of ineffective
assistance at the guilt phase. The court in reaching this decision observed:
Although our original action was appropriate for the usual habeas case, several factors compel the conclusion that we erred in remanding the case for a hearing solely
on Wilson's claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing.... The essential purpose
of federal habeas corpus is to insure that no petitioner is punished in violation of
the Constitution. When, as here, the punishment involved is death, a punishment
qualitatively different from all others, fundamental justice demands heightened vigilance in evaluating a petitioner's constitutional claims.
Id. at 882. The Court further relies on Autry v. Estelle, 719 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1983), a
case involving a similar issue, to support its decision. In Autry, the court remanded the
case to the district court for a more complete evidentiary hearing. In doing so, "we [the
Court] explained that our action was not required by any found deficiency in the most
recent evidentiary hearing but was to afford a death-sentenced prisoner every opportunity to present his claims consistent with the interest of the state." Id. at 883 (citing
Autry v. McKackle, 727 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1090 (1984).
In Autry, the court recognized "as a basic principle of justice that, if death is involved,
the petitioner should be presented every opportunity possible to present facts relevant
to his constitutional claims." Id. at 883 (citing Autry v. Estelle, 719 F.2d at 1252).
448 See Adams v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1987), where the court held that
the judge's statement to Adams' jury clearly violated the principles enunciated in Caldwell that "it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination
made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining
the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere, thereby creating an impermissible danger that the jury's recommended sentence was unreliable and consequently,
that Adams' death sentence was unreliable." See also Adams y. Wainwright, 804 F.2d
1526 (11 th Cir. 1986) (court reversed district court's denial of Adams' habeas petition
because jury instructions-that their role was advisory-left jury with false impression of
significance of their role in the sentencing process and created a danger of bias in favor
of death penalty); Cooper v. Wainwright, 807 F.2d 881, 889 (11th Cir. 1986) (court
remanded case for evidentiary hearing on petitioner's Lockett claim and held that "the
mitigating evidence petitioner proffered at trial, and cites in his habeas petition may
entitle him to a new sentencing trial"); Mann v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1471 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(prosecutor's comments made prior to sentencing can establish a Caldwell violation, especially where court exacerbated the error in the instructions at sentencing phase); Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879 (11 th Cir. 1987), (court indicated that counsel's failure in
the guilt-innocence phase of the trial may affect the outcome of the penalty phase of the
trial).

DIANE WELLS

[Vol. 80

It has become increasingly clear that the efforts exhibited by
many lower federal courts to retain the availability of post-conviction review for capital defendants indicate a reluctance to employ a
streamlined approach to federal habeas corpus law. 44 9 This reluctance stems from a recognition that such an approach is unsound
because it departs from the principles espoused in Furman. If left to
their own authority, these courts would remain loyal to the more
sound approach previously articulated and applicable to all procedural limitations inhibiting federal habeas review:
[W]hen a capital defendant raises a non-frivolous constitutional question, neither the state nor federal courts should be free to refuse to
decide it simply because it was not raised in accordance with state procedural requirements. Rather, federal law should expressly provide
that in matters
of procedural default, as in other matters, death is
4 50
different.
The Court's recent departure from the principles of Furman
should be recognized as an attempt to strip the federal courts of any
meaningful way to enforce the constitutional rights of capital petitioners through habeas review-the bulk of this enforcement longresiding in those courts. 4 5 1 In essence, then, the Supreme Court
has reduced these lower federal courts to administrative arms of a
Supreme Court dedicated to clearing the path for speedy execution, 4 5 2 no matter what the cost. In light of the fact that the
Supreme Court's recent approach to habeas review for capital defendants has proven unsound, the misguided concerns of individual
members of the Court cannot act as a base to justify denying the
federal courts the opportunity to fully perform the duties they are
deemed best apt to exercise. 45 3 Rather, the Supreme Court should
defer to the preferred approach intimated by these lower federal
courts and return to the principles of Furman.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has recently created a veritable storm of
procedural obstacles to bar access to federal habeas corpus review
for prisoners. Through its decision in Barefoot 4 54 and Smith, 4 5 5 the
Court has unjustifiably placed the capital defendant in the "eye" of
See supra notes 444-448. But see Catz, supra note 390, at 1205 n.175.
450 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 546 n.lI (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Meltzer, State Court Forfieturesof Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1222 (1986)).
451 See Boaz, supra note 189, at 349 n.l.
452 Id.
453 Id.
454 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
455 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
449
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this storm. It becomes difficult to see how one can reconcile this
Court with the one that evolutionized a precept that the eighth
amendment requires a heightened degree of reliability in any case in
45 6
which a state seeks to take the defendant's life.
While the Court's adoption of procedural formulations to limit
habeas review for capital defendants may have been deemed necessary to achieve some useful or important purpose at the outset, it
becomes highly unworkable viewed in light of the aftermath. The
Court's new procedures sanction the dissolution of the directives of
Furman. The problem this dissolution presents concerns the constitutional requirements society deems necessary to justify the state's
taking of an individual's life. It has already been established that the
Furman precept has won a vital place in our constitutional law. 4 57 In
essence, this precept acts as the leveler between two separable but
intertwined areas of law: death penalty law and constitutional law.
In order to apply one, the state must meet the requirements of the
other. By abandoning*Furman, the Supreme Court is denying the
Constitution. The Court, as guardians of the Constitution, should
not persist on this course. A contrary view runs afoul of society's
traditional sense of fairness and justice 4 58 and would espouse the
notion that a society committed to the sanctity of individual life is
willing to sacrifice constitutional values in order to clear the way for
death.
Moreover, the view that the innocent and guilty alike deserve
equal justice under the law, if accepted, must be given substance.
Capital defendants may, it is true, serve as the perfect models to
justify the temptation to resist claims of denial of constitutional
rights due to the particularly heinous nature of the crimes many of
these individuals have undoubtedly committed. However, it is in
these very instances, where notions ofjustice may easily fall prey to
notions of just deserts, that judicial prudence must reach its peak.
In the words of one judge, "[I]f we could but abstract ourselves, as a
people, from our reaction to the shocking heinous acts that have
shattered innocent lives, I believe we would still choose a system
that does not put a price upon the quality ofjustice. ' '4 59 The Court
needs to be reminded that the unpleasant consequences often renSee supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra note 180.
See Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 560 (D. N.J. 1985) ("The need to combat
crime should never be utilized tojustify an erosion of our fundamental guarantees. Indeed, the growing volume of criminal cases should make us even more vigilant; the
greater the quantity-the greater the risk to the quality ofjustice.")
459 State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 300 (N.J. 1987) (O'Hern, J., concurring).
456
457
458
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dered by strict enforcement of constitutional guarantees is merely
4 60
the necessary price to be paid for constitutional freedom.
If the Court had been faithful to the Furman precept, it would
have accounted for the extremely high reversal rate for habeas
corpus death penalty cases as well as recognized the significance of
acts taken by lower federal courts to conclude that it has been led
astray in the area of death penalty habeas corpus law and needs to
find its way back to a workable system. In the words ofJustice Stevens, "[T]he Court has lost its way in a procedural maze of its own
creation." 4 6 1 The only path leading out of this maze is by way of a
return to the principles of Furman.

460
461

See supra note 174.
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 540 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

